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SAFETY FROM FLAWED FORENSIC SCIENCES 
EVIDENCE 
Boaz Sangero* 
I.   Introduction—Modern Safety 
This article addresses the way to safety in the context of forensic 
sciences evidence. After presenting the current lack of safety, which I 
term “unsafety,” I raise some possible safety measures to contend 
with this. My suggestions are grounded on two bases: first, the 
specific analysis of each type of evidence in line with the most recent 
research on the subject; and second, modern safety theory and its 
application to the criminal justice system. It is important to stress that 
my proposals represent only some of the conceivable safety 
measures. Developing a comprehensive safety theory for the criminal 
justice system will require considerable additional cross-disciplinary 
research work, which I recommend be undertaken within the 
framework of a Safety in the Criminal Justice System Institute 
(SCJSI).1 
I have chosen, for discussion purposes, to analyze the two central 
types of forensic sciences evidence currently predominating criminal 
law: DNA testing and fingerprint comparisons. For each of these, I 
will review the most up-to-date research on the topic. I will 
demonstrate why present use of these types of evidence is not error-
free and fails to ensure safety from false convictions and then offer 
                                                                                                                 
* Professor of Law, Founder of the Criminal Law & Criminology Department, College of Law & 
Business, Ramat-Gan, Israel; and School of Law, Sapir College, Israel. I thank Prof. Rinat Kitai-
Sangero for her tremendous help in all the stages of the writing. 
 1. Introducing modern safety into systems lacking a culture of safety requires the establishment of a 
special institute to carry out this function, and the securing of resources necessary for the new institute 
to operate in a meaningful way. Thus, for example, in the field of aviation, the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) was established; in the field of transportation, the National Transportation Board 
(NTSB) was founded; in the area of food and drugs, there is the Food and Drug Administration (FDA); 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) serves the occupational field; and various 
such bodies were established in the medical field, such as the National Center for Patient Safety (NCPS) 
and the Center for Patient Safety Research and Practice (CPSRP). In all of these fields, the recognition 
of safety issues and the need to improve performance led to national focus on safety leadership, the 
development of a knowledge base, and the distribution of information—an agenda to which substantial 
resources were devoted. 
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different ways of improving safety in these contexts. I will propose a 
general solution regarding all types of forensic evidence, based on an 
earlier proposition I developed with Dr. Mordechai Halpert, namely, 
that the legislature must enact a rule that precludes the admissibility 
of forensic evidence in court unless it has been developed as a 
“safety-critical system.”2 The knowledge and solutions for 
developing safety-critical devices already exists in other engineering 
fields, such as medical devices and aviation devices. Thus, all that is 
needed is the willingness and reasonable resources to carry this out. 
Later in this article, I will offer some additional general solutions. 
This article also addresses what is known as “junk science,” which 
refers to evidence that is presented, inaccurately and misleadingly, as 
scientific evidence when it has, at best, a flimsy connection to 
science. Despite studies clearly pointing out this lack of scientific 
grounding, including the 2009 National Academy of Sciences (NAS) 
Report,3 some courts still admit such evidence as scientific evidence. 
This is proof in itself of just how far the criminal justice system is 
from being a safe system. 
In certain fields, the meaning of a “safety-critical system” is well 
understood, and resources are, therefore, invested in modern safety 
methods that significantly reduce the rate of accidents. This is the 
case, for example, in the field of pharmaceuticals and drugs, where in 
the first half of the twentieth century the need for safety was already 
acknowledged and internalized and the necessary powers and 
authorities were granted to the FDA to ensure this. This was also the 
case in the aviation field, which abandoned the obsolete “Fly-Fix-
Fly” approach in the mid-twentieth century and developed more 
advanced safety methods that generally follow an “Identify-Analyze-
Control” model and are aimed at “First-Time-Safe.” The latter 
                                                                                                                 
 2. Mordechai Halpert & Boaz Sangero, From a Plane Crash to the Conviction of an Innocent 
Person: Why Forensic Science Evidence Should Be Inadmissible Unless It Has Been Developed as a 
Safety-Critical System, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 65, 93–94 (2009). 
 3. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIS. CMTY. 
ET AL., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (Feb. 18, 2009) 
[hereinafter NAS-2009 Report]. 
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approach involves systematic identification of future hazards, 
analysis of the probability of their occurrence, and complete 
neutralization of the risk, or at least its reduction, to an acceptable 
level. Modern safety approaches such as these were implemented in 
other fields as well, such as transportation and engineering, and later 
on, in labor and medicine. These safety systems are constructed on, 
among other things, safety education and training; a culture of safety; 
a duty to report not only accidents but also incidents (near-accidents); 
professional risk assessment; a process of perpetual improvement; 
and the understanding that safety in each component of a system 
alone in detachment from the entire system is not sufficient for 
achieving system safety. 
Accidents also happen in the criminal justice system, of course, in 
the form of false convictions. For this reason, this system must also 
be classified as a safety-critical system. As systems of this type entail 
matters of life and death, any system error is likely to cause severe 
harm to both individuals and society at large. A false conviction is a 
system error and accident just like a plane crash, not only from a 
metaphorical perspective but also in the very realistic terms of 
economic cost.4 Yet, in criminal law, a “Hidden Accidents Principle” 
governs.5 Thus, the overwhelming majority of false convictions are 
never detected, which leads to the erroneous traditional and 
conservative assumption that they occur at an almost negligible rate 
and that the criminal justice system is “almost” perfect. 
Consequently, little thought has ever been given to safety in the 
system, and therefore the criminal justice system, from a safety 
perspective, lags far behind other areas of life. 
                                                                                                                 
 4. Boaz Sangero & Mordechai Halpert, A Safety Doctrine for the Criminal Justice System, MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 1293, 1304–05 (2011). The idea of incorporating into the criminal justice system a modern 
safety theory that is commonly accepted in other areas—such as space, aviation, engineering, and 
transportation—was developed jointly by myself and Dr. Mordechai Halpert and presented in a number 
of coauthored articles, particularly A Safety Doctrine for the Criminal Justice System, id. My current 
article is intended to expand on the preliminary proposition and engage in the application of the modern 
safety theory in the criminal justice system, specifically regarding forensic sciences evidence. Halpert & 
Sangero, supra note 2, at 93–94. 
 5. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 4, at 1314–16. 
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The patently flawed assumption of a low false-conviction rate has 
been challenged in recent decades, primarily because of the work of 
the Innocence Project. The Project exposes hundreds of cases of false 
convictions through genetic testing and empiric studies based on the 
Project’s findings, which point to a very high false-conviction rate: at 
least 5% for the most serious crimes and apparently an even higher 
rate for less serious crimes.6 About half of those false convictions 
were based on (presumably false) forensic sciences evidence.7 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II demonstrates the current 
state of unsafety in forensic sciences evidence. It starts from a 
discussion of the admissibility of forensic sciences evidence, from 
Frye to Daubert. It then moves to a discussion of the weight of 
forensic sciences evidence, from “uniqueness,” “individualization,” 
and “perfection” to empirical and probabilistic foundation. It ends 
with showing why a single piece of evidence should not be sufficient 
for a conviction, using Bayes’ theorem and medical diagnostics. 
Then the two central types of forensic sciences evidence currently 
predominating criminal law—DNA testing and fingerprint 
comparisons—are discussed at length. Part II ends with a critique of 
“junk science” as evidence. Part III suggests safety measures. 
II.   Unsafety in Forensic Sciences Evidence 
A.   The Admissibility of Forensic Sciences Evidence: From Frye 
to Daubert 
How can judges distinguish between “true” scientific evidence and 
inadmissible “junk” scientific evidence? In the past, the Frye 
standard, set in 1923, was the prevailing rule in American law.8 
Under this rule, “general acceptance” of the method on which the 
                                                                                                                 
 6. D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful 
Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 786–88 (2007). 
 7. BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT—WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO 
WRONG 279 fig. A.5 (2011). 
 8. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); BOAZ SANGERO, CONVICTING THE 
INNOCENT IN ISRAEL AND IN OTHER COUNTRIES—CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS 129 (2014) (Isr.). 
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evidence rests in the relevant scientific field is sufficient for it to be 
admissible in court.9 This rule predominated for seventy years until it 
was supplanted by a more sophisticated rule, set in 1993 by 
Daubert.10 Whereas the Frye rule enabled judges to refrain from a 
deep examination of the relevant scientific field and suffice with the 
fact that the method in question is generally accepted by the scientific 
community to which it belongs, the Daubert rule is designed to 
ensure greater caution: it made judges “gatekeepers,” tasked with 
blocking the entry of nonscientific evidence fraudulently presented as 
scientific into the courtroom. 
Daubert set four admissibility criteria for scientific evidence.11 
First, the scientific method on which the evidence is allegedly based 
must adhere to Karl Popper’s principle of falsifiability. That is, the 
method must be empirically testable for falsifiability or refutability, 
and must have been successfully tested in order to be considered 
scientific methodology.12 Second, the error rate of the evidence must 
be known.13 Third, the scientific method must have been subject to 
peer review and published.14 And finally, similar to the requirement 
under the Frye rule, the method must be accepted within the relevant 
scientific community.15 As Professor Alex Stein compellingly 
explained, the fourth requirement is particularly crucial: admitting 
scientific evidence that does not meet the Frye standard would 
undermine the allocation of the risk of error, which cannot be 
contingent on a judicial prediction regarding the odds of the success 
of a particular scientific progress.16 
                                                                                                                 
 9. Frye, 293 F. at 1014. 
 10. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–94 (1993). 
 11. Id.; Boaz Sangero & Mordechai Halpert, Scientific Evidence v. “Junk Science,” 11 C.L.B. L. 
STUD. 425, 430 (2014) (Isr.); Kristen Bolden, DNA Fabrication, a Wake Up Call: The Need to 
Reevaluate the Admissibility and Reliability of DNA Evidence, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 409, 419–24 
(2011). 
 12. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. 
 13. Id. at 594. 
 14. Id. at 593. 
 15. Id. at 594. 
 16. Alex Stein, Against Free Proof, 31 ISR. L. REV. 573, 587 (1997). 
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The Daubert standard, along with certain refinements of the rule, 
thus requires judges to make an effort to delve into the relevant 
scientific field and to examine the reliability and validity of the 
scientific method (which is, in effect, a classification system) on 
which the evidence is grounded.17 “Reliability” in this context refers 
to the consistency of the classification; for example, a test is reliable 
if the same result will be arrived at if performed by different experts 
at different points in time. “Valid” means that the method (the 
classification system) is suited to the purposes for which it is used. In 
the legal context, a test is valid if it suits the aim of distinguishing 
between who is guilty of committing the crime in question and who 
is innocent. A test can be reliable but not valid. For example, a test 
that uses an arbitrary rule to distinguish between guilt and innocence 
according to skin color will be a reliable test, because different 
people will concur regarding the color of a defendant’s skin and color 
will not alter over time. This method will not be valid, though, 
because the color of a person’s skin is immaterial to the question of 
his guilt or innocence. In contrast, reliability is a necessary condition 
for validity: if different experts can arrive at different outcomes, or if 
outcomes vary over time, then the test or method cannot be valid. 
In effect, then, despite the fact that the Daubert rule takes 
precedence today, the two rules—Daubert and Frye—exist side-by-
side in American case law.18 Generally, emphasis on the criterion of 
acceptance by the relevant scientific community (the Frye test) will 
lead the court to relax the requirements for recognizing the scientific 
reliability of given evidence, whereas a deeper examination of the 
scientific grounding and methodology of the evidence—in the spirit 
                                                                                                                 
 17. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 11, at 431. On validity and reliability in the legal context, see 
Sandy A. Zabell, Fingerprint Evidence, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 143, 154 (2005). 
 18. Bolden, supra note 11, at 419–24; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 11, at 431. The Daubert 
standard has been adopted in federal courts, where the federal rules of evidence also apply and set a 
similar arrangement. Fed. R. Evid. 702–03. For a review of the various states that have adopted the 
Daubert rule as opposed to those that have continued to follow the Frye rule, see Edward K. Cheng & 
Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. 
REV. 471, 472–73 (2005). 
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of the Daubert rule—will lead to a more rigorous approach.19 
Oftentimes, as judges struggle with the investigation of the scientific 
aspects with which the Daubert rule is concerned, they incorrectly 
classify methodological errors made by experts as relevant to the 
weight—and not to the actual validity—of the evidence, admitting 
evidence as scientific when it is not deserving of the title, at times 
through resort to the Frye rule.20 
One might wonder why scientific evidence in particular should be 
required to meet the criteria of reliability and validity when other 
types of evidence, such as witness testimony, are not. There are 
several possible interrelated, cumulative answers to this.21 First, 
scientific evidence is purported to be science (expert testimony is an 
exception to the hearsay rule). Second, the “aura” of science can be 
expected to blind judges and jurors and lead them to overestimate the 
real probative strength of scientific evidence. Third, in scientific 
evidence, it is more practical to require and examine reliability and 
validity. And finally, fourth, the path toward implementing 
appropriately rigorous standards for types of evidence that can 
determine defendants’ fate must begin somewhere. The next step is 
to address the remaining types of evidence and apply similar rules 
and standards to them. 
B.   The Weight of Forensic Sciences Evidence: From 
“Uniqueness,” “Individualization,” and “Perfection” to 
Empirical and Probabilistic Foundation 
Presumably, the different types of scientific evidence could have 
been expected to greatly advance and refine criminal law and make it 
more precise. There is no doubt that DNA testing and fingerprint 
comparisons—despite being termed “circumstantial” evidence—are 
                                                                                                                 
 19. David L. Faigman, Admissibility Regimes: The “Opinion Rule” and Other Oddities and 
Exceptions to Scientific Evidence, the Scientific Revolution, and Common Sense, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 699, 
701–703 (2008). 
 20. Jay P. Kesan, An Autopsy of Scientific Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 84 GEO. L.J. 1985, 
2040 (1996). 
 21. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 11, at 432. 
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far more accurate than the traditional types of evidence, referred to as 
“direct” evidence: eyewitness testimony and confessions.22 Yet in the 
framework of the first Innocence Project, misapplication of forensic 
science is the second most common contributing factor to wrongful 
convictions, found in nearly half (45%) of DNA exoneration cases.23 
Moreover, as of March 2018, in the National Registry of 
Exonerations, 517 of the 2,152 registered exonerations (24%) 
involved false or misleading forensic evidence.24 
Why is it that accurate forms of evidence can be more misleading 
than other types of evidence? One possible explanation is that they 
blind judges and jurors. As one defense attorney remarked, “If you 
put God on the witness stand . . . and God’s testimony conflicted with 
the DNA evidence, everyone would automatically say, ‘Why is God 
lying like this?’”25 We all, justifiably, hold science in the highest 
esteem. However, judges and jurors are not scientists. Judges are 
trained jurists who are required to reach determinations on a wide 
variety of issues, from all spheres of life, some of which are from the 
scientific field. In present times, human knowledge is so vast that no 
one has the capacity to be an expert in a number of fields, to be a 
“Renaissance person.” Accordingly, judges must rely on experts who 
present them with the results of scientific tests they performed. As it 
is the judges and jurors—and not the experts—who are the triers of 
fact, judges can and should demand experts not simply testify about 
the results of the tests they performed, but describe in detail their 
methodology for judges and jurors to examine. This, of course, is 
                                                                                                                 
 22. Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprints: Not a Gold Standard, 20 ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. 47, 53 
(2003). 
 23. Misapplication of Forensic Science, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
https://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/misapplication-forensic-science/ [https://perma.cc/4JNC-
PAVN] (last visited July 7, 2018). 
 24. NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS BY CONTRIBUTING FACTOR, 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/ExonerationsContribFactorsByCrime.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/9HXC-L4LT] (last visited July 7, 2018). 
 25. J. Herbie DiFonzo, The Crimes of Crime Labs, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 1 (2005) (citing Laura 
Lafay, Reasonable Doubt, STYLE WKLY. (July 6, 2005) 
https://www.styleweekly.com/richmond/reasonable-doubt/Content?oid=1380129 
[https://perma.cc/2YU8-6YT2] (quoting defense attorney David Baugh)). 
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contingent on proof of the validity and reliability of the scientific 
method used by the expert. Judges should require experts produce 
scientific written support of their approaches, but not all judges do 
so. Many rely on the experts almost blindly, to the point where, in 
practice, they serve as no more than a rubber stamp.26 
In addition, as the law is based on legal precedents, if a court—
especially a higher appellate court—makes the mistake of incorrectly 
admitting a specific type of evidence as “scientific,” it likely sets a 
precedent for other courts, which will follow the precedent without 
re-examining the scientific reliability of the method. In this way, junk 
science, too, could be found admissible by one court, and other courts 
would follow suit without engaging in the necessary scrutiny; this is 
precisely what happened over the course of many years with 
microscopical hair comparisons, footprint comparisons, and voice 
comparisons. Furthermore, even when (genuine) scientists find in 
their research that certain allegedly “scientific” types of evidence are 
not grounded in science and are unreliable and invalid, many judges, 
who are used to basing convictions on such evidence, have difficulty 
accepting this as it would mean conceding their own past mistakes.27 
In practice, a random match is possible with every type of test 
(though with DNA testing, the probability of such a match is 
extremely slim). With all tests (including DNA testing), moreover, 
there is a real possibility of a lab error or an error in the expert’s 
interpretation of the results. In contrast to the prevailing perception of 
the objectivity of all determinations in expert testimony on scientific 
evidence, certain issues are in fact contingent on the expert’s 
subjective interpretation of the findings.28 And indeed, the chance of 
error, which always exists, combined with the fallacy of the 
transposed conditional has been the underlying cause of many false 
convictions.29 
                                                                                                                 
 26. SANGERO, supra note 8, at 105–06. 
 27. D. Michael Risinger, Whose Fault?—Daubert, the NAS Report, and the Notion of Error in 
Forensic Science, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 519, 539 (2010); Sangero & Halpert, supra note 11, at 443. 
 28. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 11, at 443.  
 29. See infra Section II.C. 
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In addition, forensic lab staff work very closely with the police and 
prosecution and are often even directly subordinate to them. Police 
investigators supply lab workers with investigation details that are 
completely irrelevant to the required lab testing, but which strengthen 
the conception of the suspect’s guilt, such as the fact that a suspect 
confessed or was identified by a witness. Information of this sort is 
likely to bias the test results.30 
Jennifer Mnookin described the current situation well: 
Forensic scientists have regularly testified in courts to 
matters that are, quite honestly, both less proven and less 
certain than they are claimed to be. They have overstated 
their degree of knowledge, underreported the chances of 
error, and suggested greater certainty than is warranted. 
More generally, many kinds of forensic science are not 
entirely based on methods and approaches that we usually 
associate with validated research science. Their claims and 
the limits to their claims are not closely based on or 
constrained by the formal collection of data. Their 
empirical assertions are not grounded in careful research 
that has been subject to peer review and publication. There 
has been remarkably little formal validation of their 
methods. And there has been far too little study of how 
often forensic scientists might make mistakes, and when or 
why these possible errors are more likely to occur.31 
From the perspective of the historical development of evidence law, 
every generation has realized that the weight once accorded to certain 
types of evidence was excessive.32 Over the years, evidence that was 
formerly held to be very strong emerges, in both the research and in 
                                                                                                                 
 30. See Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Courts, the NAS, and the Future of Forensic Science, 75 BROOK. 
L. REV. 1209, 1215 (2010); DiFonzo, supra note 25, at 4; William C. Thompson, Beyond Bad Apples: 
Analyzing the Role of Forensic Science in Wrongful Convictions, 37 SW. L. REV. 1027, 1034 (2008). 
 31. Mnookin, supra note 30, at 1210. 
 32. SANGERO, supra note 8, at 47. 
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practice, as not as accurate as thought. Thus, for example, we know 
today that certain types of direct evidence once considered “classic” 
evidence—eyewitness testimony and confessions to the police33—are 
problematic and have led to many false convictions.34 During the past 
century, scientific evidence has become the evidentiary “false 
messiah.” To generalize, forensic scientists present scientific 
evidence in court as unequivocal evidence that reflects the 
uniqueness of every individual from all other human beings and 
produces a perfect identification of every person. Yet this premise of 
uniqueness is nothing more than pure conjecture, with no data to 
support it; it is based on the assumption that nature (or God) never 
repeats itself. On the one hand, it exempts forensic scientists from the 
rigors of methodological research, data collection, and incidence 
calculation, and on the other hand, it allows them to assert 
purportedly certain identification in court. As Michael J. Saks and 
Jonathan L. Koehler clarified in an article published in the leading 
journal Science, “[T]he time is ripe for the traditional forensic 
sciences to replace antiquated assumptions of uniqueness and 
perfection with a more defensible empirical and probabilistic 
foundation.”35 Moreover, they further observed elsewhere, “The 
concept of individualization, which lies at the core of numerous 
forensic science subfields, exists only in a metaphysical or rhetorical 
sense. There is no scientific basis for the individualization claims in 
forensic sciences.”36 
                                                                                                                 
 33. The confession has even been deemed “the queen of evidence,” rather than the “empress of false 
convictions” as it should be. See Boaz Sangero, Miranda Is Not Enough: A New Justification for 
Demanding “Strong Corroboration” to a Confession, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2794, 2894 n.11 (2007). 
 34. Boaz Sangero & Mordechai Halpert, Proposal to Reverse the View of a Confession: From Key 
Evidence Requiring Corroboration to Corroboration for Key Evidence, 44 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 511, 
516 (2011). 
 35. Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic Identification 
Science, 309 SCIENCE 892, 895 (2005) [hereinafter Saks & Koehler, Forensic Identification Science]. 
For a more detailed discussion, see Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Individualization 
Fallacy in Forensic Science Evidence, 61 VAND. L. REV. 199 (2008) [hereinafter Saks & Koehler, The 
Individualization Fallacy]. 
 36. Saks & Koehler, The Individualization Fallacy, supra note 35, at 202. 
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In a later article, Koehler and Saks summarized the issue as 
follows:  
 
(1) the data necessary to achieve individualization have 
never been collected for any of the forensic science 
fields which aspire to individualize the source of 
crime scene evidence to its sole possible contributor; 
(2) the best available—and perhaps the only 
scientifically defensible—approach to forensic 
identification is the use of random match probability 
estimates (which are not yet employed by any of the 
traditional forensic identification sciences); 
(3) the argument that all objects are discernibly unique 
stands on little more than an oft-repeated maxim of 
forensic science legend and the illusory intuition that 
small frequencies imply uniqueness; 
(4) probability estimates (by definition) cannot lead to 
uniqueness or individualization; 
(5) assertions of individualization generally exaggerate 
what is known or can be accomplished by forensic 
examiners.37 
 
Thus, it emerges that with the exception of the context of DNA 
comparisons, forensic experts tend to systematically violate the most 
basic scientific principle that probabilistic estimates (as well as 
verbal quantitative estimates) must be grounded in data.38 As Koehler 
noted, “the specific language used in court by experts can be the 
difference between testimony that is truly helpful and testimony that 
                                                                                                                 
 37. See Jonathan J. Koehler & Michael J. Saks, Individualization Claims in Forensic Science: Still 
Unwarranted, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1187, 1187–88 (2010); but see David H. Kaye, Probability, 
Individualization and Uniqueness in Forensic Science Evidence: Listening to the Academies, 75 BROOK. 
L. REV. 1163, 1166 (2010). 
 38. Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful 
Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 19 (2009); Sangero & Halpert, supra note 11, at 445; Mnookin, supra 
note 30, at 1210. 
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is confusing or unhelpful.”39 Accordingly, he proposed that the 
forensic linguistic community should identify clear and consistent 
standards for reporting and testifying about test results, and that its 
members be trained in elementary statistics and probability.40 In sum, 
Koehler and Saks pointedly asserted that forensic scientists should 
not be allowed “to say, in effect, ‘trust me: that’s the source.’ Real 
scientists don’t say ‘trust me.’ They provide data.”41 
A scientific approach, however, should be taken not only with 
regard to the random match probability, but also to the possibility of 
errors in lab testing. Where the possibility of a random match is very 
rare (in genetic comparisons, for example, there is often a one-in-
millions or even billions chance) and where the possibility of an error 
in the lab testing is far more common (at least one percentage rate in 
all likelihood), the courts and legislature must require that the 
prosecution provide also, and even principally, the latter figure as a 
condition for the admissibility of the evidence in court. This 
information is very important not only with respect to admissibility 
but also in terms of the correct weight to be attributed to the 
evidence. Currently, there is a tendency to ignore the possibility of 
error in lab testing, and consequently, scientific evidence is accorded 
far greater weight than what is appropriate.42 The possibility of a lab 
testing error is an inherent aspect of every scientific test. It appears 
that the law is perhaps the only sphere of life in which the tendency is 
to ignore this possibility. In the medical diagnostics field, for 
example, the incidence of the disease in the risk group to which the 
testee belongs is vital to correctly calculate the positive predictive 
value of the test and not fall victim to the “base rate fallacy.”43 The 
                                                                                                                 
 39. Jonathan J. Koehler, Linguistic Confusion in Court: Evidence from the Forensic Sciences, 21 J. 
L. & POL’Y 515, 515 (2013) (emphasis omitted). 
 40. Id. at 537–38. 
 41. Koehler & Saks, supra note 37, at 1208. 
 42. See, e.g., Simon A. Cole, More than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Print Identification, 
95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 1034 (2005). 
 43. See, e.g., Stuart Spitalnic, Test Properties 2: Likelihood Ratios, Bayes’ Formula, and Receiver 
Operating Characteristic Curves, HOSP. PHYSICIAN, Oct. 2004, at 53, 53–54; see also infra Section II. 
C. 
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FDA even requires manufacturers of medical diagnostic devices to 
provide the positive predictive value of the test they manufacture for 
different levels of the incidence of a disease among different risk 
groups.44 
In the past, a common erroneous claim (referred to in the literature 
as “case specific” or “false positive fallacy”)45 was that a court 
presumably has no need for statistics on laboratory error rates 
because it allegedly has the ability to check that all necessary 
procedures were followed in the specific case before it and, thereby, 
ensure that no error could have occurred.46 Today, it is generally 
understood that courts are incapable of making sure that no error 
occurred, and that even a negligible probability of lab error should, in 
certain circumstances, result in a significant diminishment of the 
weight of the relevant evidence.47 Errors occur even in the best of 
laboratories and even when the experts testify that all test protocols 
were followed.48 
The foremost authority in scientific evidence is the 2009 NAS 
Report, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path 
Forward,49 which was written by an interdisciplinary panel of 
distinguished scholars and practitioners. The report determined that 
the forensic science system does not function properly and that a 
significant improvement is required.50 Despite the fact that forensic 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Steven Gutman, Food and Drug Administration (FDA)’s Impact on Laboratory Performance: 
FDA’s Perspective, 42 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 786, 787 (1996); see also FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
STATISTICAL GUIDANCE ON REPORTING RESULTS FROM STUDIES EVALUATING DIAGNOSTIC TESTS 
(Mar. 13, 2007); Sangero & Halpert, supra note 11, at 445–46. 
 45. William C. Thompson et al., How the Probability of a False Positive Affects the Value of DNA 
Evidence, 48 J. FORENSIC SCI. 47, 51–52 (2003); see also infra Section II.C. 
 46. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE 85 (1996) 
[hereinafter NRC-II Report]. 
 47. NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 135. “However, even a very small (but nonzero) probability 
of false positive can affect the odds that a suspect is the source of a sample with a matching DNA 
profile.” Id. at 130; see also id. at 121 (discussing the fact that no distinction should be made between a 
lab error and a random match probability error). 
 48. William C. Thompson, Tarnish on the “Gold Standard”: Understanding Recent Problems in 
Forensic DNA Testing, 30 CHAMPION 10, 11–12, 13–14 (2006); Sangero & Halpert, supra note 11, at 
446. 
 49. NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at i; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 11, at 446. 
 50. NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 14–19. 
14
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 8
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol34/iss4/8
2018] FLAWED FORENSIC SCIENCES EVIDENCE 1143 
lab workers purport to engage in science, many lack the required 
training to do so, and there is an inadequate connection between their 
work and academic knowledge.51 This has led to significant 
knowledge gaps between scientists and forensic “scientists.”52 For 
the forensic science field to properly service the law, the 
organizational systems and structures must be significantly upgraded, 
training and qualifications improved, best practices adopted, and 
accreditation programs for laboratories made mandatory. The report 
emphasized that the most fundamental shortcoming emerged in the 
scientific knowledge of those who work in forensic science, and it 
called for genuine academic research in the area of forensic science 
to be conducted at universities.53 Accordingly, the report 
recommended the establishment of an independent federal agency 
equipped with the necessary powers, authority, and resources to 
implement fundamental changes in the area of scientific evidence.54 
Obviously, such an agency would have very important ramifications 
for safety. 
The report also recommended removing public forensic science 
laboratories from the administrative control of law enforcement 
agencies and prosecutors’ offices, standardizing laboratory reports, 
and instituting mandatory accreditation for all forensic laboratories, 
mandatory certification for all forensic workers, and a mandatory 
code of ethics.55 Another very important recommendation was to 
conduct foundational research to assess the validity and reliability of 
methods used in the analysis of evidence, especially pattern 
evidence.56 
Of particular importance to our purposes are the report chapters 
that deal individually with each of the specific types of scientific 
evidence. Even putting aside any possible errors on the part of 
                                                                                                                 
 51. Id. at 15. 
 52. Id.; see also Saks & Koehler, The Individualization Fallacy, supra note 35, at 215. 
 53. NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 27–28. 
 54. Id. at 19; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 11, at 446–47. 
 55. NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 24–26. 
 56. Id. at 22–23. 
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experts, it emerges that a considerable amount of “scientific 
evidence” is not grounded in science at all. The report estimated the 
scientific basis for each of the types of scientific evidence and types 
of pseudoscientific evidence, beginning with genetic comparisons—
the most scientific type of evidence—and ending with junk science, 
such as the microscopical hair comparisons.57 In the following 
individual discussions of some of these types of evidence, I will 
discard the “uniqueness,” “individualization,” and “perfection” myths 
and instead present their realistic weights in light of the NAS 
Report’s estimates.58 
C.   Why a Single Piece of (Scientific) Evidence Should Not Be 
Sufficient for a Conviction: Bayes’ Theorem and Medical 
Diagnostics 
1.   General 
Under the Hidden Accidents Principle in criminal law, most false 
convictions go undetected. This means that the way to safety in the 
criminal justice system must be found by drawing on the insights and 
experience of other fields, where accidents are observable. The 
medical diagnostics field can be particularly enlightening as to how 
to contend with the challenge of hidden accidents and flaws in the 
system,59 as it is prominently characterized by its efforts to find ways 
to diagnose rare diseases in low-risk populations, which are hard to 
detect.60 
Indeed, using a single piece of evidence to determine the identity 
of the perpetrator of a crime can be analogized to using a single test 
to diagnose a rare disease. Just as a medical doctor should not base 
her diagnosis on a lone test without considering the statistical 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Id. at 161. 
 58. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 11, at 447. 
 59. Boaz Sangero & Mordechai Halpert, Why a Conviction Should Not Be Based on a Single Piece 
of Evidence: A Proposal for Reform, 48 JURIMETRICS J. 43, 51–52, 90–94 (2007). 
 60. Klemens B. Meyer & Stephen G. Pauker, Screening for HIV: Can We Afford the False Positive 
Rate?, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 238, 239 (1987); Sangero & Halpert, supra note 34, at 529. 
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implications, law enforcement agents must be aware of the 
limitations of a single piece of evidence as an indicator of guilt. 
2.   Bayes’ Theorem As Odds 
Before I describe the Bayes’ Theorem and the medical diagnostic 
model, the following example can illustrate why they are so critical.61 
Assume that the manufacturer of a home HIV testing kit reports an 
average 0.1% false positive rate. Thus, if 10,000 non-carriers test 
themselves with this kit, 10 false positive HIV results would be 
obtained. Now, let us assume that John uses the kit to test himself 
and gets the positive result that he is an HIV carrier. What is the 
probability that he is truly a carrier? The obvious answer seems to be 
99.9%, with only a 0.1% likelihood of a false positive. However, a 
crucial distinction should be made between conditional probability 
and inverse conditional probability: although the probability of a 
positive test result for a healthy person is indeed 0.1%, of relevance 
to us is the probability, given a positive test result, of the person 
tested actually being a carrier. 
To illustrate, further assume that John is in a low-risk group for 
HIV: he practices safe sex; he does not use intravenous needles; he 
has never been given a blood transfusion. Say that the HIV incidence 
rate for this group is 1-in-10,000, which, in medical statistical terms, 
is the base rate (incidence of the disease) for the group.62 Thus, if 
10,000 people in John’s low-risk group were to test themselves using 
the home HIV testing kit, eleven would get a positive result: ten 
cases of error (false positives) for non-carriers (9,999 x 0.1% = ~10), 
and one case of an actual HIV carrier (because 1-in-10,000 members 
of this group is a carrier).63 Consequently, contrary to what most 
intuitively presume, there is only a 1-in-11 (approximately 9%) 
likelihood that John is an HIV-carrier if he gets a positive test result, 
                                                                                                                 
 61. This is a modified version of an example developed in Sangero & Halpert, supra note 34, at 
529–532. 
 62. Id. at 529. 
 63. Assume that there is no possibility of a false negative—that is, that there will never be a negative 
test result for a carrier. 
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or, in other words, there is a probability of 10-in-11—about 91%—
that this is a false positive.64 
This demonstrates how analyzing test results is not an intuitive 
matter. A probabilistic analysis that considers the incidence of the 
disease within the tested population will tend to show that a test that, 
at first glance, appears to have precise results is in fact completely 
inconclusive on its own. This failure to factor in the incidence of a 
disease is a cognitive failure known in the psychological literature as 
the “base-rate fallacy”65 or “base-rate neglect”66 and can be overcome 
through probabilistic analysis.67  
Bayes’ Theorem, which originated in the eighteenth century,68 is 
very significant in applied probability theory, and can be expressed in 
the form of odds: 
 
Posterior Odds = Likelihood Ratio x Prior Odds69 
 
This simple theorem holds that by updating our initial belief about 
something with objective new information, we arrive at a new and 
improved belief:70 
A simple statement of Bayes’ Theorem uses three terms. 
One is the prior odds of a proposition—that is, the odds as 
assessed before receipt of the new evidence. The second is 
the posterior odds of the proposition—that is, the odds that 
the proposition is true as assessed after receipt of the new 
                                                                                                                 
 64. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 34, at 530. 
 65. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Evidential Impact of Base Rates, in JUDGMENT UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 153, 154 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky 
eds., 1982). 
 66. Maya Bar-Hillel, The Base-Rate Fallacy in Probability Judgments, 44 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 
211, 211 (1980); Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 65, at 154; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 50. 
 67. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 48. 
 68. Thomas Bayes, An Essay Towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances, 53 PHIL. 
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON 370 (1763); Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 49–50. 
 69. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 49; see also, e.g., Spitalnic, supra note 43, at 55. 
 70. SHARON B. MCGRAYNE, THE THEORY THAT WOULD NOT DIE: HOW BAYES’ RULE CRACKED 
THE ENIGMA CODE, HUNTED DOWN RUSSIAN SUBMARINES, AND EMERGED TRIUMPHANT FROM TWO 
CENTURIES OF CONTROVERSY, at xi (2011). 
18
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 8
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol34/iss4/8
2018] FLAWED FORENSIC SCIENCES EVIDENCE 1147 
evidence. And the third is the likelihood ratio. Simply 
defined, the likelihood ratio of a given body of evidence 
with respect to a given proposition is the ratio of the 
probability that the evidence would arise given that the 
proposition is true to the probability that the evidence 
would arise given that the proposition is false.71 
If we return to John in our example, the accuracy of the test 
(99.9%) is a component of the likelihood ratio. The likelihood ratio 
here is the quotient of two conditional probabilities; the numerator is 
the probability that the test result will be positive given that the 
person tested is a carrier, and the denominator is the probability that 
the test result will be positive given that the person tested is not a 
carrier. If we assume a zero-probability of a false negative (i.e., a 
negative test result for a carrier), the following likelihood ratio 
results:72 
Likelihood Ratio = 1 / 0.001 = 1000 
The Prior Odds here are the probability that a person is a carrier of 
the disease divided by the probability that he is not, without taking 
the test result into account. The Prior Odds for John, who is a 
member of a low-risk group with a base rate of 1-in-10,000, are as 
follows: 
 
Prior Odds = 0.0001 / (1 – 0.0001) ≅ 0.000173 
 
The Posterior Odds are the probability that a person is a carrier 
divided by the probability that he is not, given a positive test result. If 
                                                                                                                 
 71. Richard D. Friedman, A Presumption of Innocence, Not of Even Odds, 52 STAN. L. REV. 873, 
875 (2000). 
 72. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 49. 
 73. Id. The denominator is supposed to complete the numerator to one, because the probability that a 
person is a carrier and the probability that he is not a carrier are complementary probabilistic 
occurrences. Id. at 49 n.33. 
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we now insert the figures we arrived at above into Bayes’ Theorem, 
the resultant odds follow: 
 
Posterior Odds = Likelihood Ratio x Prior Odds = 1000 x 0.0001 = 0.1 
 
John’s Posterior Odds, then, are 1-in-10: only one in eleven people 
who test positive from John’s low-risk group will actually be a 
carrier, while ten of the eleven positive test results will be false. This 
is the same result we arrived at above without using Bayes’ Theorem 
directly but by applying its underlying rationale.74 
As noted, the mistaken intuition that if the home HIV test is 99.9% 
accurate, that there is only a 0.1% probability that John is not a 
carrier if he tests positive (as opposed to the actual 91% probability 
of error), is the result of the base rate fallacy, which is also referred to 
as “the fallacy of the transposed conditional”: rather than calculating 
the probability that a person is not a carrier given a positive test result 
(10/11 = ~91%), the probability of a non-carrier getting a positive 
test result is calculated (1/1,000 = 0.1%). From a Bayesian 
perspective, the source of this fallacy is that the Prior Odds are 
ignored and, consequently, the Posterior Odds are equated with the 
Likelihood Ratio. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky have put this 
failure most succinctly: “The failure to appreciate the relevance of 
prior probability in the presence of specific evidence is perhaps one 
of the most significant departures of intuition from the normative 
theory of prediction.”75 
3.   Applying Bayes’ Theorem in the Criminal Justice System 
Lawyers, judges, and jurists are no less susceptible to these 
cognitive fallacies, for when they are relying on a single piece of 
evidence to convict a defendant, they are ignoring the Prior Odds and 
                                                                                                                 
 74. Id. at 49–50. 
 75. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80 PSYCHOL. REV. 237, 
243 (1973); Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 50. 
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the important distinction between conditional probability and inverse 
conditional probability. 
In the criminal justice context, the given occurrence is a positive 
result yielded by scientific or other evidence. The probability of a 
person being a disease carrier in the medical diagnostic context is 
replaced by the probability of someone being guilty of a crime in the 
legal context; the probability of a person not being a carrier is 
replaced by the probability of a person being innocent. In medical 
diagnostics, the prior probability can be derived from the base rate; in 
criminal justice, the prior probability is the judge’s (or the fact 
finder’s) assessment of the defendant’s guilt or innocence based not 
on the main evidence but on other evidence.76 
It is important to note here the debate as to whether Bayes’ 
Theorem can and should be applied in criminal law, which began 
with the canonical exchange between Michael O. Finkelstein, 
William B. Fairley, and Laurence H. Tribe.77 I am not, however, 
proposing that judges (or fact finders) apply Bayes’ Theorem to make 
precise calculations to determine the cumulative weight of evidence. 
What I am suggesting, rather, is that the underlying logic of the 
formula be used to understand the risks of convicting a defendant 
based on one piece of evidence alone (of any type) and to persuade 
legislators to enact a safety rule that prohibits conviction based on a 
single piece of evidence. 
To illustrate, consider two hypotheses and one given event.78 
Under the first hypothesis, the suspect’s Guilt (designated “G”) is 
assumed, and under the second hypothesis, the suspect’s Innocence 
(designated “I”) is assumed. The given event is the specific piece of 
Evidence incriminating the suspect (designated “E”), which could be 
                                                                                                                 
 76. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 51. 
 77. See generally Michael O. Finkelstein & William B. Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to 
Identification Evidence, 83 HARV. L. REV. 489, 489 (1970); Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: 
Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1329 (1971); see also Alex Stein, 
Judicial Fact-Finding and the Bayesian Method: The Case for Deeper Skepticism About Their 
Combination, 1 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 25, 25 (1996); Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 52; 
Edward K. Cheng, Reconceptualizing the Burden of Proof, 122 YALE L.J. 1254, 1254 (2013). 
 78. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 34, at 539–41. 
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an eyewitness lineup identification or incriminating forensic lab test 
results. The basic odds formula is as follows:79 
Likelihood Ratio x Prior Odds = Posterior Odds 
The Likelihood Ratio (also known as the Bayes’ Factor, which is 
used to update our prior beliefs with the evidence that we observe)80 
is the quotient of two conditional probabilities. The numerator is the 
probability of the existence of the evidence assuming the suspect is 
guilty, and the denominator is the probability of the existence of the 
evidence assuming the suspect is innocent.81 This is the mathematical 
expression of the strength of the evidence. For example, if the 
incriminating evidence is an eyewitness identification in a police 
lineup, then a Likelihood Ratio of ten means a likelihood the suspect 
was correctly identified as the guilty culprit ten times greater than the 
likelihood the suspect is innocent and mistakenly identified. But the 
Likelihood Ratio is not, by itself, a sufficient indicator of a suspect’s 
guilt or innocence, as it does not take into account any other evidence 
aside from one specific piece of evidence, and instead presumes what 
is actually yet to be proven (the numerator assumes guilt and the 
denominator innocence).82 
The Prior Odds are the probability of a suspect’s Guilt divided by 
the probability of his Innocence without taking into consideration the 
identification and the other admissible evidence.83 These odds are 
called “Prior” because they reflect what we believe prior to observing 
the evidence.84 Bayes’ Theorem “updates” these prior beliefs by 
incorporating the evidence that we observe.85 The Posterior Odds are 
then the product of the Likelihood Ratio times the Prior Odds.86 This 
                                                                                                                 
 79. Id. at 539–40. 
 80. Cheng, supra note 77, at 1267. 
 81. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 34, at 540. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Cheng, supra note 77, at 1266. 
 85. Id. at 1267. 
 86. Id. 
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represents the weight of the central piece of evidence combined with 
the other incriminating evidence against the suspect, expressed as 
follows:87 
 
Posterior Odds = P (Guilt│Evidence) / P (Innocence│Evidence) 
 
When the Posterior Odds are 1, the probability of guilt is identical to 
the probability of innocence (only a 50% likelihood that the suspect 
is guilty). The greater the Posterior Odds, the greater the probability 
of guilt.88 
Elsewhere, I have demonstrated with Dr. Mordechai Halpert the 
tremendous significance of not only the Likelihood Ratio but also the 
Prior Odds when a single piece of evidence is the basis for a 
conviction.89 If we assume a Posterior Odds threshold of ninety as the 
minimum requirement for a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, 
which is the criminal law standard of proof, then about 5% of the 
convictions will be false. The following table further demonstrates 
the significance of the Prior Odds and the Likelihood Ratio, using 
different numerical values in applying Bayes’ Theorem:90  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 87. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 34, at 540–41. 
 88. Id. at 541. 
 89. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 54–55. 
 90. See Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 54 (modified version of the previous table). 
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Table 1: Probabilities of Guilt under Bayes’ Theorem 
 
   Prior Odds 
 
 Likelihood Ratio Posterior Odds
Probability of Guilt 
Given the Evidence 
(rounded out) 
1 
(“50:50”) 10 
10:1 
(10 G v. 1 I) 91% 
1/10 
(1 G v. 10 I) 100 10:1 91% 
1/100 1,000 10:1 91% 
1/1,000 10,000 10:1 91% 
1/10,000 100,000 10:1 91% 
1/100,000 1,000,000 10:1 91% 
1/1,000,000 10,000,000 10:1 91% 
1/10,000 1,000 0.1:1 9% 
 
Table 1 demonstrates that even a slight possibility of error in a 
piece of evidence leads to the practical impossibility of showing guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt based solely on that evidence (that is to 
say, in the absence of any other evidence that impacts the Prior 
Odds). For example, when the Prior Odds are 1-in-100,000 (or 1 in 
more than 100,000) only evidence that has an error rate below 1-in-
1,000,000 will result in the desired Posterior Odds of 10 (probability 
of guilt 91%). Yet, in reality, no evidence has or can have such a low 
error rate and high level of accuracy. Moreover, the Prior Odds could 
be very low, one in millions, when there is exculpatory evidence such 
as an alibi. In such circumstances, for a conviction to be based upon 
this evidence, the accuracy of the (scientific) evidence should be an 
error rate of one error in several tens of millions of cases. 
x =
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Finally, the bottom row of the table indicates the error rate that can 
be expected for realistic evidence, namely, 1-in-1,000. Thus, if the 
Prior Odds of guilt are 1-in-10,000, the Posterior Odds will be a mere 
0.1:1. In other words, 91% of convictions based on scientific 
evidence with a 1:1000 error rate and Prior Odds of 1:10,000 will be 
false. 
As long as a given piece of evidence has not been shown to meet a 
certain (unrealistic) very high precision requirement, it should not 
constitute the sole grounds for convicting the defendant in question. 
4.   Insights and Lessons from the Field of Medical Diagnostics 
Table 2 sets out some fundamental definitions and formulas used 
in the medical diagnostic model:91 
 
Table 2: The Generic 2 x 2 Table 
 Has Condition Does Not Have Condition  
Test Positive A B 
Total Positive 
Tests 
(A + B) 
Test Negative C D 
Total Negative 
Tests 
(C + D) 
 
Number in Sample 
with Condition 
(A + C) 
Number in Sample 
Without Condition 
(B + D) 
Total Number 
of Subjects 
(A + B + C +D) 
                                                                                                                 
 91. With some minor modifications, the definitions, formulas, and table are from Spitalnic, supra 
note 43, at 54; see also Stuart Spitalnic, Test Properties 1: Sensitivity, Specificity and Predictive Values, 
HOSP. PHYSICIAN, Sept. 2004, at 27, 27. 
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 “Sensitivity” refers to the probability that a test will be positive 
for a patient who has the tested-for condition (e.g., HIV). 
Sensitivity = A / (A+C) 
 “Specificity” refers to the probability that a test will be 
negative for a patient without the tested-for condition. 
Specificity = D / (D+B) 
 “Positive Predictive Value” (PPV) refers to the probability that 
a patient has the condition given a positive test result. 
PPV = A / (A+B) 
 “Negative Predictive Value” (NPV) refers to the probability 
that a patient does not have the condition given a negative test 
result. 
NPV = D / (C+D) 
Professionals in the testing diagnostics and measuring device 
manufacturing fields commonly use these above concepts in 
describing a test’s results.92 Because of the crucial importance of the 
data collected based on these concepts, FDA approval requires that 
manufacturers of medical devices not only provide data on a test’s 
Specificity and Sensitivity, but also on the Positive and Negative 
Predictive Values for the various populations,93 and the information 
must be made public.94 This is a quintessential safety measure, for, as 
demonstrated above in the HIV-test example, a test may be suitable 
                                                                                                                 
 92. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 44, at 7–8. 
 93. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 4, at 1298. 
 94. 21 U.S.C. § 360j(h)(4)(B) (2012). 
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for diagnosing high-risk populations but not (on its own at least) for 
diagnosing low-risk groups. 
It is vital that those who will engage in safety in the legal field 
apply the error-prevention model developed and refined in the 
medical diagnostics field. The need for this is self-evident, first and 
foremost with regard to forensic evidence, which should not, in 
essence, be any different from all other scientific tests. The medical 
diagnostics model is suitable for weighing nonscientific evidence as 
well. Had even the most basic medical diagnostics model been 
adopted in the criminal justice system, it would have long arrived at 
the imperative safety rule that a conviction cannot be based on a 
single piece of evidence of any type. None of the types of evidence 
currently accepted in criminal law is suited to this function. The 
law’s disregard for this problem is one of the central causes of the 
phenomenon of false convictions. 
D.   DNA Testing 
As described in the 2009 NAS Report, “[u]nlike many forensic 
techniques that were developed empirically within the forensic 
[science] community, with little foundation in scientific theory or 
analysis, DNA analysis is a fortuitous byproduct of cutting-edge 
science.”95 And certainly, DNA has strong probative value. But not 
even this type of evidence, considered the gold standard of forensic 
science, is error-free. 
1.   Random Match Probability 
The basic assumption in DNA testing is that with the exception of 
identical twins, every person’s DNA is unique. However, for the 
purposes of DNA forensic evidence, not all the molecules in the two 
DNA samples are tested and compared. 
Andrea Roth has provided a clear and detailed description of the 
DNA testing process: “During forensic testing, DNA is amplified and 
                                                                                                                 
 95. NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 99. 
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typed at several locations, or loci, along the genetic strand.”96 A 
DNA profile consists of two genetic markers (alleles) at each locus, 
representing the two alleles a person inherits from each of his two 
parents at that locus.97 The main iteration of DNA-matching 
technology is called Short Tandem Repeat (STR).98 The Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and state laboratories use STR to test 
thirteen loci.99 The DNA analysts use a statistical table developed by 
the FBI based on sample groups of approximately two hundred 
people from each of four racial categories to estimate the chances of 
finding each particular allele at each particular locus in the different 
racial groups.100 Based on the assumption that the allelic frequencies 
among the loci are independent, the analyst multiplies the 26 (13x2) 
frequencies together to report for each group a “Random Match 
Probability” (RMP), the probability that a random person will have 
the twenty-six-allele profile.101 
It is important to recall that the court is not called upon to 
determine the RMP, but rather the inverse conditional probability: 
namely, the probability that the two samples belong to the defendant 
and that, given a match, he is indeed guilty of the crime for which he 
is accused.102 To determine this probability, all the non-DNA-related 
evidence must be examined, either by applying the Bayes’ Theorem 
rationale or any other accepted method.103 The erroneous belief that 
                                                                                                                 
 96. Andrea Roth, Safety in Numbers? Deciding When DNA Alone Is Enough to Convict, 85 N.Y.U. 
L. Rev. 1130, 1135 (2010). For additional explanations of the scientific aspect of DNA testing, see 
David H. Kaye, DNA Evidence: Probability, Population Genetics, and the Courts, 7 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 101, 104 (1993); FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 129–210 
(3d. ed. 2011); NAT’L COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, WHAT EVERY LAW ENFORCEMENT 
OFFICER SHOULD KNOW ABOUT DNA EVIDENCE, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/bc000614.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E55R-QUJR] (last visited July 7, 2018); Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 72. 
 97. Roth, supra note 96, at 1135. 
 98. Id. at 1135–36. 
 99. Id. at 1136. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 72. 
 103. Id.; see also Roth, supra note 96, at 1156. 
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the random match probability represents the probability of the 
defendant’s innocence is termed the “prosecutor’s fallacy.”104 
The possibility of a random match in a DNA comparison is not 
particularly problematic in the context of a criminal trial, because it is 
well known that this probability must be taken into account.105 Yet 
because the chances of a random match are at times expressed in 
astronomical terms (say, a one-in-a-billion probability of a match 
between the defendant’s DNA and the crime scene DNA sample), 
courts run a considerably greater risk of falsely convicting an 
innocent defendant based on a DNA comparison when they ignore 
the possibility of lab error (as, unfortunately, is often the case).106 
The danger of error is far greater when the police have no specific 
suspect whose DNA profile they can compare to the sample from the 
crime scene (Verification), and instead must look for a match to one 
of the (millions) of DNA profiles in the DNA database (Identification 
or Database Search). This “cold hit” method can be expected to lead 
to false identifications,107 and thus the results of such a database 
search must not be admissible as evidence but, rather, serve only as a 
means for finding suspects. Once a suspect is found, other significant 
evidence connecting him to the crime should be searched for; in the 
absence of such evidence, the suspect should be acquitted if brought 
to trial.108 An important question, beyond the scope of this article, is 
what boundaries should be imposed on such database searches under 
Fourth Amendment protections.109 
                                                                                                                 
 104. Koehler, supra note 39, at 521. 
 105. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 73. 
 106. People v. Reeves, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 728, 753 (2001) (“[B]ecause appellant has not presented 
persuasive evidence of an ongoing controversy in the scientific community, we conclude that the NRC’s 
recommendation is generally accepted, and DNA probability calculations need not be modified to 
account for a laboratory error rate.”); Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 79. 
 107. But see Rick Visser, When DNA Won’t Work, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 39, 41 (2012). 
 108. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 53; see also Roth, supra note 96, at 1134. The author 
suggests a threshold of a 99.9% source probability (1-in-1,000) as satisfying the “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” requirement. Id. at 1168. I believe that this is not sufficient, as it relates only to the possibility of 
a random match and almost completely neglects the much greater possibility of a laboratory error. 
 109. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 465–66 (2013); David H. Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory 
of Arrestee DNA and Other Biometric Databases, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1095, 1096 (2013); David H. 
Kaye, Why So Contrived? Fourth Amendment Balancing, Per Se Rules, and DNA Databases after 
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The use of partial DNA profiles is another problem in this context. 
Although the current U.S. standard is to test thirteen loci to arrive at a 
twenty-six-allele profile, partial DNA profiles containing fewer 
alleles can also be searched against profiles in databases110 (such as 
the FBI’s Combined DNA Index System).111 Using such partial DNA 
evidence to support prosecuting someone the police have identified 
as a suspect, particularly when other evidence already points to his 
guilt, is, in itself, not objectionable. Problems arise, however, when 
police reverse the order of their investigative methodology: when 
investigators screen a partial genetic profile against DNA profiles 
data to “trawl” for potential suspects, rather than matching the partial 
DNA profile taken from the crime scene against an already-identified 
suspect.112 As Michael Naughton and Gabe Tan explain, three 
hazards arise.113 First, there is no way to estimate with sufficient 
certainty a match between the suspect’s profile and the crime -scene 
profile if the latter is not complete.114 The authors illustrate this with 
the example of Raymond Easton, whose six STR markers matched 
the crime scene profile, but later on, when four other loci were tested, 
none was a fit.115 Second, the match probability increases 
significantly with a partial profile, and thus, speculative searches of 
partial crime scene profiles against DNA profiles in databases often 
produce multiple “matches.”116 Third, this problem makes innocent 
individuals whose DNA profiles are in the database more vulnerable 
to becoming suspects for a crime they did not commit and, 
accordingly, being falsely convicted.117 
                                                                                                                 
Maryland v. King, 104 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 535, 535 (2014); Catherine W. Kimel, DNA Profiles, 
Computer Searches, and the Fourth Amendment, 62 DUKE L.J. 993, 993 (2013); Erin Murphy, License, 
Registration, Cheek Swab: DNA Testing and the Divided Court, 127 HARV. L. REV. 161, 161 (2013). 
 110. Michael Naughton & Gabe Tan, The Need for Caution in the Use of DNA Evidence to Avoid 
Convicting the Innocent, 15 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 245, 251–53 (2011). 
 111. See NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 100. 
 112. Naughton & Tan, supra note 110, at 252. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 252–53. 
 116. Id. at 253. 
 117. Id. 
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In an Arizona forensics laboratory in 2001, analysts found a nine-
STR locus match between two unrelated individuals.118 The random 
match probability for a match of a nine-locus genotype in Arizona 
was “1 in 754 million in Caucasians” and “1 in 561 billion in African 
Americans.”119 In 2005, during proceedings in an Arizona court in a 
case in which the state had only typed nine loci, a DNA analyst 
testifying for the defense stated that she had found approximately 
ninety nine-locus, partial matches in a relatively small database with 
only 65,493 entries.120 These findings seem to contradict the usual 
court testimony of forensic experts, who tend to estimate the RMP as 
one in millions, billions, or trillions.121 Keith Devlin, a 
mathematician at Stanford University, dismisses the extreme RMP 
numbers presented in courts as “nonsense” and “lies.”122 Moreover, 
some defense lawyers and researchers requested access to convicted-
offender databases (such as the FBI’s CODIS and the National DNA 
Index System, or NDIS) to empirically test the theoretical 
estimates.123 In response, the FBI threatened that if states opened 
their databases to external scientists or defendants, the FBI would 
terminate their participation in the national database system.124 In his 
article, Trawling DNA Databases for Partial Matches: What Is the 
FBI Afraid Of?, David Kaye observed as follows: 
[T]he release of the data, stripped of personal identifiers, 
for population-genetics research is permissible . . . the FBI 
has nothing to fear and should reverse its policy of not 
researching the issue and maintaining the secrecy of the 
data . . . the public and the legal community need to know 
that all reasonable efforts have been made to verify the 
                                                                                                                 
 118. David H. Kaye, Trawling DNA Databases for Partial Matches: What Is the FBI Afraid Of?, 19 
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 145, 153 (2009). 
 119. Id. at 154. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See id. at 155. 
 122. Id. at 148. 
 123. Id. at 149. 
 124. Kaye, supra note 118, at 149. 
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accuracy of the numbers that are given to police, judges, 
and juries. Disclosure of the databases in anonymized form 
is the best policy.125 
I agree with Kaye. A few researchers, including Bruce Weir and 
Laurence Mueller, have used simulations with databases in their 
research.126 But the databases available to these researchers are 
relatively small.127 I contend that conducting expanded simulations 
on the NDIS would be an important safety tool for the criminal 
justice system. Indeed, people should not be judged and sentenced to 
jail based on theories and RMP calculations alone when we can 
verify (using strong computers) the exact RMP for each number of 
loci in a profile. 
Last, another significant problem is that many crime scene DNA 
samples contain a mixture of DNA from two or more people. This 
could also lead to the false identification of an innocent suspect as the 
perpetrator of the crime being investigated.128 Indeed, the title of 
Naughton and Tan’s article frames this concern in the very terms that 
underlie the objective of this article: “The Need for Caution in the 
Use of DNA Evidence to Avoid Convicting the Innocent.”129 
A recent special report to the President discussed this problem of a 
mixture of DNA from two or more people.130 The report 
distinguishes sharply between DNA analysis of single-source and 
simple-mixture samples and DNA analysis of complex-mixture 
samples.131 In the first category, DNA analysis “is an objective 
method in which the laboratory protocols are precisely defined and 
the interpretation involves little or no human judgement” (although 
                                                                                                                 
 125. Id. at 150. 
 126. Id. at 161. 
 127. Id. at 155. 
 128. Naughton & Tan, supra note 110, at 254–55. 
 129. Id. at 245. 
 130. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., 
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY 
OF FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS 7 (2016). 
 131. Id. at 7–8. 
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“errors can and do occur . . . sample mix-ups, contamination, 
incorrect interpretation, and errors in reporting”), whereas “subjective 
analysis of complex DNA mixtures has not been established to be 
foundationally valid and is not a reliable methodology.”132 
2.   Laboratory Error 
There is a significant risk of false conviction with DNA evidence 
due to the strong tendency to ignore the huge impact of a possible lab 
error in the DNA testing. The NAS 2009 report corrected this 
dangerous omission,133 but as I will demonstrate, court verdicts have 
yet to reflect this. 
The relatively recent use of genetic comparisons as scientific 
evidence in criminal trials did not emerge until the 1980s.134 When 
attorneys first began to submit evidence from DNA testing in court, 
forensic experts claimed absolute reliability and zero probability of 
error in the tests.135 Yet Koehler has rightly called for a distinction 
between a DNA match and a report of a DNA match based on their 
differing probabilities of error.136 Indeed, the National Academy of 
Sciences found that: 
Although DNA laboratories are expected to conduct their 
examinations under stringent quality controlled 
environments, errors do occasionally occur. They usually 
involve situations in which interpretational ambiguities 
occur or in which samples were inappropriately processed 
and/or contaminated in the laboratory. Errors also can 
occur when there are limited amounts of DNA, which 
                                                                                                                 
 132. Id. The report describes efforts to develop computer programs that apply various algorithms to 
interpret complex mixtures in an objective manner and recommends development of objective methods. 
Id. at 78. 
 133. See NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 132. 
 134. Kaye, supra note 96, at 101; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 72. 
 135. Thompson et al., supra note 45, at 47–48. 
 136. Jonathan J. Koehler, On Conveying the Probative Value of DNA Evidence: Frequencies, 
Likelihood Ratios, and Error Rates, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 859, 868–69 (1996); Sangero & Halpert, supra 
note 59, at 73. 
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limits the amount of test information and increases the 
chance of misinterpretation. Casework reviews of mtDNA 
analysis suggest a wide range in the quality of testing 
results that include contamination, inexperience in 
interpreting mixtures, and differences in how a test is 
conducted.137 
Research has shown that a wide variety of factors can account for 
errors in DNA testing.138 For example, cross-contamination and 
sample mix-ups can be chronic occurrences at even the best DNA 
laboratories.139 The hazards and risks increase with Polymerase 
Chain Reaction (PCR) typing methods,140 which entail the 
duplication of a small amount of DNA to produce a larger amount 
sufficient for conducting the DNA test.141 Here, even minute 
contamination of the small sample is likely to be dangerously 
amplified into a significant contamination of the enlarged sample, 
which biases the test results. Errors can occur at any phase of the 
testing, beginning with the sample-collecting stage and through to the 
actual test itself.142 In addition, the test involves subjective 
interpretation of lines that appear at its conclusion,143 and an 
incorrect interpretation is likely to yield an erroneous result.144 Even 
                                                                                                                 
 137. NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 132. 
 138. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 73. 
 139. Thompson, supra note 48, at 11. 
 140. Naughton & Tan, supra note 110, at 247; NRC-II Report, supra note 46, at 83–84. 
 141. The definition of PCR given in the FBI Standards for DNA Quality Assurance Standards for 
Forensic DNA Testing Laboratories (2009) is as follows: 
Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) is an enzymatic process by which a specific region of DNA is 
replicated during repetitive cycles which consist of the following: (1) denaturation of the template; (2) 
annealing of primers to complementary sequences at an empirically determined temperature; and (3) 
extension of the bound primers by a DNA polymerase. 
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, QUALITY ASSURANCE STANDARDS FOR FORENSIC DNA TESTING 
LABORATORIES 6 (2011), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/quality-assurance-standards-for-forensic-
dna-testing-laboratories.pdf/view [https://perma.cc/6QKJ-ZHHU] [hereinafter FBI Standards for DNA]. 
 142. NRC-II Report, supra note 46, at 87. 
 143. William C. Thompson et al., Evaluating Forensic DNA Evidence: Essential Elements of a 
Competent Defense Review: Part 1, 27 CHAMPION 16, 18 (2003); NRC-II Report, supra note 46, at 84–
85. 
 144. NRC-II Report, supra note 46, at 84–85. 
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the most human of errors, such as mislabeling samples, are possible 
in the best laboratories and even when the lab workers are certain that 
they have taken every precaution against error.145 
Some of the risks of scientific evidence are similar to those that 
arise with medical diagnostic tests,146 but while the FDA fully 
regulates manufacturers of medical diagnostic devices, there is no 
such regulation of manufacturers of scientific evidence equipment, 
including DNA testing equipment, despite the many risks entailed.147 
For example, there is no error reporting duty for DNA testing 
equipment, which is accepted practice in safety-critical systems.148 
This lack of duty leads to unsafety.149 
An illustrative example is the user manual Applied Biosystems 
supplies with the DNA testing kits it manufactures,150 which states as 
follows in bold lettering: “For Research, Forensic and Paternity Use 
Only. Not for use in diagnostic procedures.”151 What this means is 
that the same, lone piece of evidence that is a sufficient basis for 
convicting and sentencing someone to an extended prison term or 
even death is insufficient foundation for a medical diagnosis.152 Not 
                                                                                                                 
 145. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 89 (1992). For a deeper 
discussion of the causes of error, see Naughton & Tan, supra note 110, at 246–47; Thompson et al., 
supra note 45, at 1; James Herbie DiFonzo, In Praise of Statutes of Limitations in Sex Offense Cases, 41 
HOUS. L. REV. 1205, 1233–61 (2004). 
 146. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 4, at 1305. 
 147. See François Pompanon et al., Genotyping Errors: Causes, Consequences and Solutions, 6 
NATURE REV. GENETICS 847, 852–53 (2005); Thompson et al., supra note 45, at 10, 14. The FBI’s 
Quality Assurance Standards for Forensic DNA Testing Laboratories is important, but the only standard 
for DNA kits is imposed on laboratories and not manufacturers. FBI Standards for DNA, supra note 
141, at 19 (“Standard 9.3[:] The laboratory shall identify critical reagents and evaluate them prior to use 
in casework. These critical reagents shall include but are not limited to the following: [] Test kits or 
systems for performing quantitative PCR and genetic typing.”). 
 148. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 4, at 1305. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 1306. 
 151. APPLIED BIOSYSTEMS, AMPFLSTR IDENTIFILER, PCR AMPLIFICATION KIT: USER’S MANUAL, at 
ii (2001), http://projects.nfstc.org/workshops/resources/literature/Ampflstr_Identifiler_users_manual.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6PEQ-LD5M]. The warning was recently slightly modified to “For Forensic or 
Paternity Use Only.” APPLIED BIOSYSTEMS, AMPFLSTR SGM PLUS PCR AMPLIFICATION KIT: USER’S 
MANUAL 2 (2012), 
http://www3.appliedbiosystems.com/cms/groups/applied_markets_support/documents/generaldocument
s/cms_041049.pdf [https://perma.cc/E5N9-7Q6R]. 
 152. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 4, at 1306. 
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surprisingly, problems with Applied Biosystems software have 
emerged,153 and it seems that the software was never approved by the 
FDA.154 
Accidents and incidents are not a rare phenomenon in DNA 
testing.155 Exemplifying this is the widespread contamination 
discovered at the British Forensic Service. Researchers found that the 
DNA of twenty employees of the microfuge tubes manufacturer had 
contaminated the DNA evidence in scores of cases,156 reporting that 
contamination had been found in approximately 10% of scenes.157 A 
similar case arose in Germany. In 2008, the German police offered a 
100,000 Euro award for information leading to the arrest of a serial 
killer known as the “Phantom of Heilbronn.”158 Traces of her DNA 
had been found at some forty crime scenes in Germany, Austria, and 
France, six of them murders.159 In 2009, it was revealed that in fact 
there had never been a serial killer, and instead, the DNA found at all 
the crime scenes belonged to an innocent female worker at the 
Bavarian factory that manufactures the cotton swabs used in the 
DNA collection.160 The swabs had been contaminated with her 
DNA.161 
Of course, optimists will maintain that the worst-case scenario of 
such cases of contamination is not the false accusation of an innocent 
                                                                                                                 
 153. Jason R. Gilder et al., Systematic Differences in Electropherogram Peak Heights Reported by 
Different Versions of the GeneScan Software, 49 J. FORENSIC SCI. 92, 95 (2004); Sangero & Halpert, 
supra note 4, at 1306. 
 154. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 4, at 1306. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Kevin Sullivan et al., New Developments and Challenges in the Use of the UK DNA Database: 
Addressing the Issue of Contaminated Consumables, 146 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 175, 176 (2004) (cited in 
Sangero & Halpert, supra note 4, at 1306). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 4, at 1307; Reward for “Phantom Killer” Reaches Record 
€300,000, LOCAL (Jan. 13, 2009, 4:55 PM), http://www.thelocal.de/national/20090113-16739.html 
[https://perma.cc/5NSN-M5LE]; David H. Kaye, Commentary, GINA’s Genotypes, 108 MICH. L. REV. 
FIRST IMPRESSIONS 51, 52 (2010). 
 159. Kaye, supra note 158, at 52; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 4, at 1307. 
 160. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 4, at 1307. 
 161. Reward for “Phantom Killer” Reaches Record €300,000, supra note 158; Kaye, supra note 158, 
at 52; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 4, at 1307. 
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person, but that the actual perpetrator remains at large.162 But this is 
flawed thinking from the perspective of safety. First, safety in DNA 
testing could reduce the risk of false negatives, which are what allow 
the actual perpetrators to roam free. Second, safety in DNA testing 
would also reduce the risk of false positives that result from the 
relatively easy and undetectable sample contamination. A primary 
hazard is cross-contamination between the genetic matter of an 
innocent suspect (or someone who becomes a suspect after the DNA 
test) and the DNA sample taken from a crime scene, which leads to 
the mistaken conclusion that the suspect committed the crime.163 
In some cases, cross-contamination can lead to a false conviction, 
which almost occurred in the Jaidyn Leskie murder investigation164 
and the Russell John Gesah case,165 and actually occurred in the 
Farah Jama case.166 A prominent case in which cross-contamination 
almost led to a false conviction is that of Jack Bellamy, a convicted 
sex offender who was charged with the murder of Jane Durrua. In 
2004, a DNA sample taken during the 1968 murder investigation was 
found to match Bellamy’s DNA.167 It later emerged, however, that 
                                                                                                                 
 162. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 4, at 1307. 
 163. Thompson, supra note 48, at 10–12; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 4, at 1307. 
 164. In the Jaidyn Leskie murder investigation, DNA samples taken from a young, “mentally 
challenged” girl matched the samples taken from the murder scene. GRAEME JOHNSTONE, INQUEST INTO 
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13 (2010) (Austl.), https://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/papers/govpub/VPARL2006-10No301.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GYJ2-7KW6]. Jama served about a year and a half until the prosecutor informed the 
court, in 2009, that the DNA sample had apparently been contaminated. Id. at 46. The court vacated the 
conviction, and Jama was released from prison. Id. at 47; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 4, at 1308. 
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the same laboratory processed Bellamy’s original DNA sample and 
the sample from the Durrua investigation at the same time, giving 
serious reason to suspect cross-contamination,168 and leading the 
prosecutor to drop the charges against Bellamy. Finally, in 2008, 
different results were achieved when the samples were tested by 
other laboratories, after which charges were filed against a new 
suspect, Robert Zarinsky, for the same murder.169 
Not all DNA testing errors are detected. In the case of John Ruelas 
and Gary Lieterman, for example, their DNA samples were found to 
match DNA found at a 1969 murder crime scene.170 Ruelas, who had 
been four years old at the time of the murder, was clearly not the 
perpetrator.171 Lieterman, in contrast, was convicted of the murder, 
despite the lack of a reasonable explanation for the match between 
Ruelas’ DNA and the DNA at the crime scene, and disregarding the 
fact that the sample from the victim and samples from the two 
suspects were processed in the same laboratory at the same time.172 
Given the Hidden Accidents Principle in criminal law, had Ruelas 
been an adult and not a child at the time of the murder, he would 
likely have been falsely convicted and the probability of cross-
contamination never revealed.173 
The media often reports on DNA testing mishaps, but does not 
always provide accurate information in doing so.174 And as there is 
no reporting duty or duty to investigate DNA testing accidents—let 
alone incidents—the media is often the exclusive source of this 
information.175 Consequently, again, not only does the criminal 
                                                                                                                 
2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/17/nyregion/dna-leads-to-arrest-in-68-rape-and-murder-of-girl-
13.html?sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/2TUG-6YT2]; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 
4, at 1308. 
 168. William C. Thompson, The Potential for Error in Forensic DNA Testing (and How That 
Complicates the Use of DNA Databases for Criminal Identification), COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE 
GENETICS 28–29 (2008). 
 169. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 4, at 1308. 
 170. Thompson, supra note 48, at 14; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 4, at 1308–09. 
 171. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 4, at 1308. 
 172. Id. at 1309. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
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justice system lack a safety approach for preventing accidents, but it 
also makes no consistent attempt to learn from experience; that is, not 
even the outdated Fly-Fix-Fly method is applied in criminal law in a 
systematic fashion.176 
William C. Thompson has reported on the considerable errors and 
problems in how DNA laboratories are managed in the United States 
and elsewhere in both confirmation cases and “cold hit” database 
searches.177 His findings are based on laboratory records and point to 
an unexpectedly high rate of detected cases of mislabeling and 
sample contamination.178 Although the particular instances of 
laboratory contamination Thompson recorded were uncovered at 
early stages, he nonetheless noted that they raise grounds for concern, 
because cross-contamination is a regular occurrence even in the top-
rated laboratories and “the same processes that cause detectable 
errors in some cases can cause undetectable errors in others.”179 
Thompson noted that “[e]rrors that incriminate a suspect are unlikely 
to be detected as errors; they are likely to be treated as incriminating 
evidence.”180 He also considered the possibility of lab workers 
falsifying test results to cover up contamination incidents, which “can 
be the result of negligence, and cost a [lab] worker his job.”181 
Koehler, in turn, has reported on professional proficiency tests that 
were not blind.182 “The error rates in these tests were tremendous, 
varying between 1% and 4%.”183 Section II.C shows the tremendous 
significance of such an error rate. Moreover, Koehler, Audrey Chia, 
and Samuel Lindsey claimed that when the probability of a 
laboratory error is much greater than the RMP, the latter probability 
                                                                                                                 
 176. Id. 
 177. Thompson, supra note 48, at 11. 
 178. Id. at 13. 
 179. Id. at 12. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id.; see also Richard O. Lempert, After the DNA Wars: A Mopping Up Operation, 31 ISR. L. 
REV. 536, 552–53 (1997); Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 75. 
 182. Jonathan J. Koehler, Error and Exaggeration in the Presentation of DNA Evidence, 34 
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 183. Koehler, supra note 182, at 26; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 75. 
39
Sangero: Safety from Flawed Forensic Sciences Evidence
Published by Reading Room, 2018
1168 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:4 
is insignificant and the former probability is the relevant statistic.184 
To illustrate, an RMP of 1-in-100-million creates a bias against the 
defendant, even if the probability of a laboratory error is 1%, because 
the RMP is the only statistic the jury hears. It is therefore preferable 
not to report the RMP to the jury. In a later article, Koehler made the 
recommendation—which I fully support—that the jury instructions 
on the possibility of an error in the testing include only one statistic, 
relating to both the RMP and lab error combined.185 
Another claim Koehler raised is that the average error rate of all 
forensic laboratories should be considered in the absence of statistics 
regarding the error rate of the laboratory that performed the actual 
testing.186 I take the further step, however, of maintaining that the 
absence of statistical data on the error rate of the relevant laboratory 
should render its test results inadmissible as criminal evidence given, 
among other things, the Daubert rule. Alternatively, if the court 
nonetheless admits the results as evidence, safety considerations 
mandate that the error rate of the relevant laboratory be assumed to 
be at the highest level for laboratories of the same type.187 
It has been claimed that retesting can reduce the error rate, 
particularly if it is performed by a different laboratory,188 but this 
would not reduce the error rate to zero. First of all, the same cause of 
error in the first round of testing could quite possibly reoccur in the 
retesting at the second laboratory;189 indeed, different laboratories 
have been known to make the same mistakes.190 There are a variety 
of reasons for the same mistake to be repeated in different 
laboratories, including the erroneous analysis of the lines obtained in 
                                                                                                                 
 184. Jonathan J. Koehler et al., The Random Match Probability in DNA Evidence: Irrelevant and 
Prejudicial?, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 201, 210–11 (1995); Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 76. 
 185. Koehler, supra note 39, at 533. 
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and Daubert, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1959, 1981–85 (1994). 
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 189. David J. Balding, Errors and Misunderstandings in the Second NRC Report, 37 JURIMETRICS J. 
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the test and contamination of the sample before the first test.191 
Another problem is that the first laboratory sometimes uses up all of 
the sample material, making retesting impossible.192 
Despite this, retesting could still prevent certain laboratory errors 
that lead to false convictions. Thus, as a necessary safety procedure, a 
legal rule should be passed requiring retesting DNA samples by an 
independent, objective expert as a condition for basing a conviction 
on DNA testing lab results.193 However, DNA evidence should not 
suffice alone for convictions, because performing a second test will 
not neutralize altogether the significant risk of error. 
Finally, Israeli researchers exposed the possibility of DNA 
fabrication as another source of concern when they created artificial 
DNA that can fool current forensic testing procedures.194 Following 
this, it was suggested that “the discovery of the ability to easily 
fabricate DNA evidence as well as a long history of DNA 
falsification and gross ineptness by crime laboratories demonstrate 
that DNA-based evidence’s sterling reputation is undeserved.”195 
3.   Summary and Recommendations 
Although it is undisputed that DNA evidence is significant, 
weighty evidence that the courts must rely on, it must not be allowed 
to constitute the sole basis for a conviction in a criminal trial, because 
sole reliance creates a tangible danger that the conviction will be 
wrongful.196 
Indeed, as discussed, the likelihood of a lab error in DNA testing 
tends to be considered in detachment from the other evidence in a 
                                                                                                                 
 191. Thompson et al., supra note 45, at 48. 
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case,197 even though such errors are unavoidable and the court has no 
way of determining whether these errors occurred in the specific case 
at issue. Not even retesting in another laboratory will fully fix this 
problem. Moreover, although the probability of a lab error (which 
may occur in 1 in 100 cases) is much higher than the RMP, juries are 
not supplied with this statistic and instead hear only the impressive 
RMP statistic (which could amount to one-in-a-billion or even trillion 
cases). 
Because there are no adequate statistics on the error rates of 
different laboratories, the prosecution should bear the burden of 
establishing these rates regarding the specific laboratory that 
performed the testing upon which the prosecution relies.198 Above I 
suggested two alternative safety mechanisms when there is a lack of 
data on a specific laboratory; the court must either find the evidence 
inadmissible or admit it while ascribing the highest known rate of 
error for tests performed in laboratories of the relevant sort. 
In 2009, the FBI released its Quality Assurance Standards for 
Forensic DNA Testing Laboratories.199 These groundbreaking 
standards, based partially on the recommendations in the NAS 
reports,200 include requirements for protocols regarding, among other 
things, the interpretation of DNA, mixed samples, and 
contamination.201 Also included are important standards relating to 
quality assurance programs, education and training of laboratory 
personnel, lab reports, lab reviews, proficiency testing, and corrective 
                                                                                                                 
 197. Id. at 79. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Revised Quality Assurance Standards, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., 
https://strbase.nist.gov/revisedQAS.htm [https://perma.cc/283A-3DEW] (last visited July 7, 2018). For 
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action when discrepancies are detected in proficiency tests and 
casework analysis.202 
Although this is important progress, these are only the first steps 
forward, as these standards should be mandatory for each and every 
federal and state laboratory. This has the potential to be an effective 
safety program, but to achieve this the standards must not simply 
require that labs formulate their own protocols, the standards must 
instead actually formulate in detail—and enforce—the necessary 
protocols. 
In addition, a regulatory regime similar to the mandatory 
premarket approval process for medical diagnostic devices should be 
instituted for manufacturers of scientific evidence devices, including 
DNA kits.203 This regime should impose an accident-reporting duty 
as well as a duty to report incidents that involve accuracy, similar to 
the arrangement for medical devices. This would supplement and 
support existing safety recommendations relating to accreditation of 
laboratories, as set forth in the 2009 NAS Report.204 
Another important way to ensure safety in the context of DNA 
testing and evidence is the performance of extended simulations on 
the NDIS. Using strong computers, researchers should verify and 
find out the exact RMP for each number of loci in a profile. Finally, 
the above-mentioned recommendation of the Report to the President 
(2016) should be adopted: to develop objective methods of 
interpreting complex DNA mixtures.205 
E.   Fingerprint Comparisons 
1.   The Possibility of Error 
There are four stages to the basic approach of latent fingerprint 
experts, known as ACE-V: Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and 
                                                                                                                 
 202. Id. at 10, 22–26 (Standards 5, 11–14). 
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Verification.206 In the analysis stage, the examiner closely examines 
the latent print associated with the crime being investigated and 
decides whether there is enough useful information contained in the 
image to make it “of value” for further examination.207 If there is, the 
examiner marks up the print and documents the minutiae he or she 
observes.208 In the comparison stage, the analyst compares the latent 
print to a particular source print, noting observed similarities and 
differences.209 In the evaluation stage, the expert reaches one of three 
possible conclusions: exclusion, identification, or inconclusive.210 If 
the first expert reaches an identification conclusion, then a second 
expert conducts the same process in the verification stage.211 
Fingerprint evidence has long been considered very strong 
evidence.212 Throughout the twentieth century, both courts and the 
general public regarded it as the epitome of reliable and certain 
evidence, and it served as a basis for many convictions.213 Yet in 
recent years, this special status has become the subject of criticism 
for not being grounded in solid statistical theory and for being subject 
to error.214 
As discussed above, general consensus exists as to the possibility 
of a random match in a DNA comparison so that all of the loci 
compared in a test will be identical for a number of people. For this 
                                                                                                                 
 206. Mnookin, supra note 30, at 1217. 
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 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at 1217–18. 
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reason, the test results are given in statistical form: in a population of 
X million people, on average, Y persons will share the same genetic 
profile. However, the prevailing assumption regarding fingerprint 
comparisons is that every fingerprint is unique and there is zero 
possibility of a random match.215 Consequently, courts tend not to 
require random match data for fingerprints and the prosecution 
therefore does not present any such data during trial. In effect, no 
data addresses this possibility,216 and there is no scientific proof that 
it is impossible for two people to have the same points of comparison 
in a fingerprint examined by an expert.217 Forensic experts testifying 
in court present this evidence as unequivocal instead of making an 
effort to investigate and provide data about Random Match 
Probability. This testimony leads jurors to perceive this evidence as 
far stronger than it actually is.218 
A 2002 study arrived at a 6.10×10−8 probability of a fingerprint 
with thirty-six minutiae points sharing twelve minutiae points with 
another arbitrarily chosen fingerprint with thirty-six minutiae 
points.219 Thus, some statistical theories have found a possibility of a 
random match between fingerprints, similar to cases with DNA 
comparisons.220 Examiners comparing two different peoples’ 
fingerprints may find them so similar that they cannot distinguish 
between them.221 
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In the early 1990s, British researchers examined the sixteen-point 
standard for comparing fingerprints followed in England and 
Wales.222 Their research findings showed the subjective nature of 
fingerprint analysis: different examiners arrived at entirely different 
points and numbers of comparison.223 The results of proficiency tests 
for 156 fingerprint examiners, conducted in the United States under 
the auspices of the International Association for Identification and 
published in 1996, reinforced this outcome.224 These results shocked 
the forensic science community: of the 156 examiners tested, only 
sixty-eight had both correctly identified the five latent print 
impressions that they were supposed to identify and correctly noted 
the two elimination latent prints that they were not supposed to 
identify.225 In total, scientists counted forty-eight false matches.226 
The combined results of these proficiency tests show that fingerprint 
examiners get erroneous results in an average of 0.8% of cases227—a 
significant error rate. 
Of course, errors in fingerprint analysis also occur in actual cases 
before the courts. Simon Cole reviewed twenty-two documented 
cases in the United States, England, and Scotland in which people 
were arrested and, at times, even served prison sentences before the 
error was detected.228 Considering the Hidden Accidents Principle in 
criminal law, this is likely only the tip of the iceberg of errors in 
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fingerprint analysis, but most errors have not been detected and the 
falsely convicted inmates remain in prison. 
A number of issues may cause frequent laboratory errors in 
fingerprint analysis, including: poor quality of fingerprints taken 
from the crime scene (as opposed to the good quality of prints calmly 
scanned by access control systems),229 automated fingerprint 
identification systems,230 substandard or unscientific practices among 
certain “experts,”231 and pressure exerted on laboratory staff by the 
police and/or prosecution to find a match.232 In addition, latent 
images are often distorted, smaller in surface area than the full print, 
and frequently contain artifacts resulting from the processes 
necessary to make latent prints visible. As a result, two impressions 
from two different sources could be mistaken as coming from the 
same source.233 
Leading forensic science researchers have called for the 
abandonment of “absolute conclusions” and, instead urge for the 
recognition of the inherently probabilistic nature of fingerprint 
evidence.234 The key question is not the uniqueness of friction ridge 
skin, but rather the fingerprint examiner’s ability to derive sufficient 
information from very limited sources. The researchers have 
suggested replacing experience and tradition alone with transparent 
and empirically-based practice.235 Yet, as Mnookin describes the 
current situation, 
ACE-V’s relationship to the scientific method is tenuous at 
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best . . . [L]atent fingerprint examination as a field lacks 
any formalized specifications about what is required in 
order to declare a match. There is no required minimum 
number of points of resemblance or minimum number of 
total print features, nor any required quantum of any 
specific kind of ridge detail . . . Two fingerprint analysts 
will often focus on different minutiae in their examination 
of the same print . . . The judgment is fundamentally a 
subjective one, not based on any formalized measures of 
either quantity or sufficiency. Additionally, latent 
fingerprints examiners do not generally employ any 
statistical information or models in the ordinary ACE-V 
process . . . [T]here simply is no well-accepted, fully-
specified statistical model that is available for latent 
fingerprint examiners to employ . . . [F]undamentally, 
fingerprint matching ought to be thought of as a 
probabilistic inquiry.236 
2.   The Brandon Mayfield Case and the U.S. Department of 
Justice’s Report 
Following the 2004 terror attacks in Madrid, which led to 191 
deaths and 2,050 nonfatal injuries, the Spanish police found a 
fingerprint on a blue plastic bag near one of the attack sites; it 
contained detonators and explosives remnants.237 The Spanish police 
requested assistance from the FBI,238 which searched its fingerprint 
database using an Automated Fingerprint Identification System 
(AFIS). The search printout identified twenty potential suspects.239 In 
analyzing the samples from the possible suspects, a fingerprint 
examiner found a match between the print taken from the attack site 
and that of a Portland, Oregon, attorney named Brandon Mayfield.240 
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Mayfield told FBI interrogators that he had never been to Spain in his 
life, had been in the United States at the time of the attacks, and did 
not even have a passport.241 Nonetheless, three senior FBI examiners 
verified the identification of Mayfield’s fingerprints,242 and the 
affidavit supporting an arrest warrant for Mayfield in the United 
States declared a 100% positive identification.243 While Mayfield 
was in detention, the court appointed an independent fingerprint 
examiner to verify the identification made by FBI examiners.244 Two 
weeks after Mayfield’s arrest, the Spanish police located someone 
else, an Algerian named Ouhnane Daoud, whose fingerprints 
matched the prints found on the plastic bag at the scene of the 
attacks.245 Thus, the 100% “certain” identification of Mayfield’s 
fingerprints by four different examiners was wrong. Mayfield was 
released246 and subsequently received $2 million in compensation.247 
In 2006, the U.S. Justice Department released a comprehensive 
report on the Mayfield case.248 The report stated that the main cause 
of the false identification was the very strong similarity between 
Mayfield’s fingerprint and the print from the attack site, which, 
according to Spanish police, belonged to Ouhnane Daoud.249 The 
report explained that it is possible for a great similarity between 
fingerprints to arise in an AFIS search, as the system scans millions 
of prints and compares each to the prints found at the scene of the 
crime.250 The system produces a list of twenty candidates who it has 
found to have the most similar fingerprints to the crime scene 
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fingerprints.251 Consequently, the fingerprint examiners had to 
analyze fingerprints that were very similar to those of Daoud. The 
report cautioned that the risk of error with “cold hit” database 
searches is far greater than when suspects are identified by way of a 
regular police investigation,252 and the constantly growing size of the 
databases increases the risk of misidentification.253 
Peer pressure and “expectation bias” also played a role in the 
misidentification; once the first expert has declared a match between 
prints, the verifying experts naturally expect to find the same 
match.254 And indeed, the Justice Department report determined that 
the second verifying examiner knew that the first examiner had found 
a match between Mayfield’s print and the fingerprints from the scene 
of the crime.255 Thus, the report recommended withholding such 
information from verifying examiners.256 
Another factor in the match found in the misidentification of 
Mayfield’s prints is cognitive bias. Mayfield had converted to Islam 
sometime earlier, his wife was Egyptian, and he had once represented 
a known terrorist in a child custody dispute.257 The report determined 
that this background information did not influence the initial 
identification of a match, as it was unknown to police investigators at 
the time, but it did impact the verification stage when examiners had 
this data.258 Forensic examiners often have access to or are provided 
with external information about the case that is irrelevant to the 
analysis,259 and research has shown that this impacts the analysis. 
Itiel E. Dror et al. used the Mayfield case to prove “contextual bias” 
in these circumstances. Five experts were each given a different pair 
of latent prints and potential source prints and told that they were the 
                                                                                                                 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. at 7. 
 253. Mnookin, supra note 30, at 1229. 
 254. Id. at 1230. 
 255. U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, supra note 230, 10–11. 
 256. Id. at 11. 
 257. Id. at 2. 
 258. Id. at 11–12. 
 259. Mnookin, supra note 30, at 1230. 
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prints from the well-known Mayfield case, when in fact each expert 
received a pair of prints that the same expert had previously 
analyzed, identified, and testified to in court as a 100% match.260 In 
the Dror et al. experiment, three of the experts arrived at the opposite 
conclusion of no match, likely due to bias; one expert found the 
prints “inconclusive”; and only one was consistent and again 
identified a match between the prints.261 Other experiments 
conducted by Dror et al. with different experts also found bias.262 
Although the medical diagnostics and other scientific fields make 
formalized efforts to shield researchers from “contextual 
information,” no such procedures generally exist in the forensic 
sciences field.263 Thus, to prevent some of the biases, I suggest giving 
fingerprint examiners not just the suspect’s print to compare against 
the latent print from the crime scene, but also several “filler” prints 
from other people as well. This will prevent the examiner from 
knowing at the outset which print belongs to the suspect.264 
As we then see, errors in fingerprint analysis can and do (as in the 
Mayfield case) actually occur in reality and are not a mere theoretical 
probability. Moreover, given the Hidden Accidents Principle, there 
are likely many more cases in which these errors remain 
undetected.265 Compounding this problem is the fact that some 
fingerprints are so similar to one another that examiners are incapable 
of distinguishing between them. Thus, the general error rate in 
fingerprint analysis is unknown.266 Although the general error rate is 
                                                                                                                 
 260. Itiel E. Dror, David Charlton & Ailsa E. Péron, Contextual Information Renders Experts 
Vulnerable to Making Erroneous Identifications, 156 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 74, 75 (2006). 
 261. Id. at 76; see also Mnookin, supra note 30, at 1232. 
 262. Itiel E. Dror & D. Charlton, Why Experts Make Errors, 56 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 600, 600 
(2006); Itiel E. Dror & Robert Rosenthal, Meta-analytically Quantifying the Reliability and Biasability 
of Forensic Experts, 53 J. FORENSIC SCI. 900, 903 (2008); see also Mnookin, supra note 30, at 1232. 
 263. Mnookin, supra note 30, at 1230–31. 
 264. See Gary L. Wells et al., Forensic Science Testing: The Forensic Filler-Control Method for 
Controlling Contextual Bias, Estimating Error Rates, and Calibrating Analysts’ Reports, 2 J. APPLIED 
RES. MEMORY & COGNITION 53, 53 (2013) (offering a similar recommendation); see also William C. 
Thompson, What Role Should Investigative Facts Play in the Evaluation of Scientific Evidence, 43 
AUSTRALIAN J. FORENSIC SCI. 123, 123 (2011). 
 265. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 68. 
 266. Mnookin, supra note 30, at 1227–28; Mnookin, supra note 214, at 59. 
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commonly estimated to be low, proficiency tests given to examiners 
belie this estimate. Above in Section II.C we have seen the 
tremendous significance of even a very low error rate. 
3.   Case Law 
Fingerprint analysis evidence is generally sufficient as the sole 
basis for a conviction in American courts.267 Over the last decade and 
a half, courts have begun to indicate skepticism with regard to this 
type of evidence,268 with some explicitly holding errors to be possible 
in fingerprint comparisons.269 However, the problematic report 
referred to by the FBI as the “50K Study” gave undeserving support 
to fingerprint evidence.270 Although the findings of this so-called 
study were never published in a scientific journal or subject to peer 
review (as the Daubert standard requires),271 judges have nonetheless 
relied on these findings in their rulings.272 
The “study” was in fact conducted to find support for the claim 
relied on by prosecutors that every fingerprint is unique and that false 
positive errors are not possible in fingerprint comparisons.273 FBI 
examiners used an AFIS search with a computerized database of 
50,000 fingerprints to compare each fingerprint against itself and 
against the 49,999 other fingerprints in the database.274 This process 
                                                                                                                 
 267. See, e.g., People v. Rhodes, 422 N.E.2d 605, 608 (Ill. 1981); People v. Ford, 606 N.E.2d 690, 
693 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); see also Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 69. 
 268. See United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 565 (E.D. Pa. 2002); see also Epstein, 
supra note 213, at 269; Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility Rulings 
from Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1189, 1196–97 (2004); David H. 
Kaye, The Nonscience of Fingerprinting: United States v. Llera-Plaza, 21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1073, 
1074 (2003); Michael Lynch & Simon A. Cole, Science and Technology Studies on Trial: Dilemmas of 
Expertise, 35 SOC. STUD. SCI. 269, 270 (2005); Mnookin, supra note 22, at 48; Sangero & Halpert, 
supra note 59, at 69. 
 269. United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 273–74 (4th Cir. 2003) (Michael, J., dissenting); State v. 
Quintana, 103 P.3d 168, 171 (Utah Ct. App. 2004); Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 68. 
 270. Epstein, supra note 213, at 629–32; Cole, supra note 42, at 1046–48, 1047 n.334. 
 271. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993). 
 272. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 239–41 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. 
Sanchez-Birruetta, 128 Fed. Appx. 571, 573 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 273. Sanchez-Birruetta, 128 Fed. Appx. at 573; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 70–71. 
 274. Mitchell, 365 F.3d at 225; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 70. 
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yielded 2.5 billion comparisons (50,000 × 50,000),275 which some 
courts considered as evidence that false positives cannot occur in 
fingerprint comparison.276 
The main methodological flaw in the FBI “study” was the 
comparison of the fingerprint images against themselves.277 For the 
study to have been scientifically valid, the 50,000 images should 
have been compared with 50,000 other images of the same 
fingerprints, i.e. there should have been two different images of each 
fingerprint. When 50,000 images are compared against themselves, 
there is of course no possibility of error. The image is stored on the 
computer as a digital file, which is a collection of digits. When two 
images are identical, the digits that represent them will also be 
identical. Two different digital images, however, even of the same 
fingerprint, will be represented in the computer’s memory by 
different digits, and in this case, an error is possible. If we take what 
occurs in the reality of a forensic fingerprint comparison, two 
different images are in fact compared: the one from the crime scene 
and the image of the suspect’s fingerprint. Given this grave analytical 
mistake, this “study” has unsurprisingly drawn harsh criticism from 
experts in the field.278 
Mnookin has described three approaches in American case law to 
fingerprint evidence.279 The first is to simply ignore the problem: 
courts hold that fingerprint evidence easily passes the Daubert test 
and disregard all the above-mentioned difficulties with this 
evidence—the lack of scientific testing, the lack of a meaningful 
error rate, and the lack of a statistical foundation or validated, 
objective criteria for determining a match.280 The second approach 
                                                                                                                 
 275. Mitchell, 365 F.3d at 225. In a second experiment, they compared partial prints. Id. at 226. 
 276. Sanchez-Birruetta, 128 Fed. Appx. at 571, 573. 
 277. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 70. 
 278. Champod & Evett, supra note 234, at 112; David H. Kaye, Questioning a Courtroom Proof of 
the Uniqueness of Fingerprints, 71 INT’L STAT. REV. 521, 521 (2003); Pankanti et al., supra note 217, at 
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 279. Mnookin, supra note 30, at 1241–65. 
 280. Id. at 1243–47. The example is the verdict in United States v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848, 855 
(S.D. Ind. 2000). 
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seemingly applies the Daubert test to the fingerprint evidence but too 
easily concludes its admissibility: “these courts, though squirming a 
bit and acknowledging some of the legitimate concerns regarding the 
research basis for this evidence, find that, on balance, the evidence 
still warrants admission in its traditional form, though without fully 
explaining what justifies this conclusion.”281 The third approach 
courts take is to allow the fingerprints expert to testify on the 
similarities and differences in the patterns at issue, while prohibiting 
or limiting her from presenting conclusions regarding the meaning of 
the similarities.282 
Based on the 2009 NAS Report, discussed in detail below, 
Mnookin offers another approach, namely “Exclusion (for Now)”:283 
[A]t present, pattern identification evidence does not have 
the empirical data to back up the claims made in court. 
Moreover, just as with DNA evidence—which, after an 
initial honeymoon period, was excluded by a number of 
jurisdictions for a short period of time because of concerns 
about the subjectivity of standards for determining a match; 
insufficient research into the underlying questions of 
population genetics; and general technical sloppiness—
exclusion would be a great motivator for pursuing the 
research necessary to justify admissibility . . . 
 
. . . Good proficiency tests, which show the extent to 
which examiners make errors in a variety of different levels 
of difficulty, should suffice to support a finding of adequate 
validity, presuming that the error rates discovered through 
this testing process are tolerably low, and the match 
between what was tested and the “task at hand” in the 
                                                                                                                 
 281. Mnookin, supra note 30, at 1248–52. The example is the verdict in United States v. Sullivan, 246 
F. Supp. 2d 700, 702–04 (E.D. Ky. 2003). 
 282. Mnookin, supra note 30, at 1252–64. An example is the verdict in United States v. Llera Plaza, 
179 F. Supp. 2d 492, 516 (E.D. Pa. 2002). 
 283. Mnookin, supra note 30, at 1265. 
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particular case is sufficiently close . . . 
 
. . . [T]he courts should care less about the details of the 
method . . . and more about what evidence there is to 
support the conclusion that the methods actually work . . . 
 
. . . 
 
. . . [H]ow accurate are examiners when matching latent 
prints to a particular source; latent prints which are often 
partial, frequently smudged, and perhaps even distorted?284 
Mnookin estimates that if judges require that experts provide the 
error rate of their work as a prerequisite for the admissibility of 
fingerprint evidence, research will be conducted and very important 
knowledge produced.285 Experts should not be able to simply claim 
an error rate of zero and they must give up the claim that they are 
able to individualize.286 I find this view convincing and an important 
step on the way to safety in fingerprint evidence. In fact, in a 
promising decision from 2007, a court excluded fingerprint evidence, 
describing it as “a subjective, untested, unverifiable identification 
procedure that purports to be infallible.”287 
4.   The 2009 NAS Report 
As opposed to the “50K study,” the most informative document on 
the accuracy of fingerprint comparison is the 2009 NAS Report on 
forensic science in the United States.288 The report deals with 
fingerprints under the category of “friction ridge analysis”: palm 
                                                                                                                 
 284. Id. at 1265–67. 
 285. Id. at 1243. 
 286. Id. at 1275. 
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prints and sole prints.289 The report found that the “training of 
personnel to perform latent print identifications varies from agency to 
agency” and can amount to only a one-week-long course.290 “Not all 
agencies require [that their staff] acquire and maintain 
certification.”291 As mentioned above, the technique used to examine 
prints is Analysis-Comparison-Evaluation-Verification (ACE-V).292 
In the analysis stage, the examiner considers the following features: 
condition of the skin, type of residue, mechanics of touch, nature of 
the surface touched, development technique, capture technique, and 
size of the latent print.293 In the next stage, a visual comparison is 
made between the latent print and the known print derived from the 
suspect.294 The examiner then performs source determination by 
evaluating whether there is identification.295 Last, there is verification 
of the first examiner’s findings by another qualified examiner, who 
repeats the observations and comes to a conclusion, although he or 
she may be aware of the conclusion arrived at by the first 
examiner.296 The NAS Report describes the process and its 
problematic subjective aspects as follows: 
Note that the ACE-V method does not specify particular 
measurements or a standard test protocol, and examiners 
must make subjective assessments throughout. In the 
United States, the threshold for making a source 
identification is deliberately kept subjective, so that the 
examiner can take into account both the quantity and 
quality of comparable details. As a result, the outcome of a 
friction ridge analysis is not necessarily repeatable from 
examiner to examiner. In fact, recent research by Dror has 
                                                                                                                 
 289. Id. at 136–55. 
 290. Id. at 136. 
 291. Id. at 137. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. at 137–38. 
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shown that experienced examiners do not necessarily agree 
with even their own past conclusions when the examination 
is presented in a different context some time later.297 
It is important to stress again in this context that the experts usually 
work with the police and have knowledge of details of the 
investigation, such as the fact that the suspect was identified by the 
victim. This extraneous knowledge is likely to influence the expert’s 
subjective evaluations as to a match between the prints. The report 
notes further on this issue: 
This subjectivity is intrinsic to friction ridge analysis, as 
can be seen when comparing it with DNA analysis . . . 
 
. . . By contrast, before examining two fingerprints, one 
cannot say a priori which features should be 
compared . . . For these reasons, population statistics for 
fingerprints have not been developed, and friction ridge 
analysis relies on subjective judgments by the examiner. 
Little research has been directed toward developing 
population statistics, although more would be feasible.298 
A safety approach, however, would lead to this much-needed 
research, which should lead in turn to the design and implementation 
of objective standards. 
On the matter of “methods of interpretation,” the report found that: 
The clarity of the prints being compared is a major 
underlying factor . . . Clearly, the reliability of the ACE-V 
process could be improved if specific measurement criteria 
were defined. Those criteria become increasingly important 
when working with latent prints that are smudged and 
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incomplete, or when comparing impressions from two 
individuals whose prints are unusually similar.299 
The report also referred to the reporting of results: “the friction ridge 
community actively discourages its members from testifying in terms 
of the probability of a match.”300 
The report concurred301 with Mnookin’s observations, which she 
stated as follows: 
Experts therefore make only what they term “positive” or 
“absolute” identifications—essentially making the claim 
that they have matched the latent print to the one and only 
person in the entire world whose fingerprint could have 
produced it . . . [S]uch claims . . . are unjustified . . . 
Therefore, in order to pass scrutiny under Daubert, 
fingerprint identification experts should exhibit a greater 
degree of epistemological humility. Claims of “absolute” 
and “positive” identification should be replaced by more 
modest claims about the meaning and significance of a 
“match.”302 
In its “summary assessment,” the report referred to Lyn Haber and 
Ralph Norman Haber’s work,303 where they showed that there is no 
scientific evidence of the validity of the ACE-V method.304 
Examiners differ at each stage of the method in their conclusions, and 
no single protocol has been officially accepted by the profession; 
therefore, the validity of the ACE-V method cannot be tested. The 
report also noted that two legal decisions have highlighted the crucial 
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issues of the lack of documentation and lack of data as to the error 
rate.305 Another justified “criticism of the latent print community is 
that examiners can too easily explain a ‘difference’ as an ‘acceptable 
distortion’ in order to make an identification.”306 
Finally, the report made a very important recommendation: the 
establishment of an independent federal agency to regulate, 
supervise, and improve forensic sciences, to be known as the 
National Institute for Forensic Science (NIFS).307 
5.   The 2012 Expert Working Group Report 
Perhaps the most significant development in this field of late is the 
2012 National Institute of Standards and Technology report, entitled 
Latent Print Examination and Human Factors: Improving the 
Practice through a Systems Approach—The Report of the Expert 
Working Group on Human Factors in Latent Print Analysis.308 The 
report’s most noteworthy recommendation, consistent with the 
recommendations in the 2009 NAS Report, is as follows: “Because 
empirical evidence and statistical reasoning do not support a source 
attribution to the exclusion of all other individuals in the world, latent 
print examiners should not report or testify, directly or by 
implication, to a source attribution to the exclusion of all others in the 
world.”309 Another important recommendation relates to the 
problematic and flawed use of AFIS searches, as illustrated by the 
Brandon Mayfield case: 
When comparing latent prints to exemplars generated 
through AFIS searches, examiners must recognize the 
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possibility and dangers of incidental similarity. 
Adjustments such as a higher decision threshold, stricter 
tolerances for differences in appearance, and explicit 
feature weighting need to be considered. Modified quality 
assurance practices for this scenario also should be 
considered.310 
Other important recommendations in the report relate to reporting, 
documentation, and testimony, including the adoption of codes of 
ethics.311 There is also a set of recommendations that stem from a 
safety approach, as proposed in this article. As explained in the 
report: 
Supervision of the staff members and management of the 
facilities are essential to risk reduction and quality 
assurance and control. Effective management requires good 
information about the incidence and sources of errors. 
Making the information available requires a culture in 
which both management and staff understand that openness 
about errors is not necessarily a path to punitive 
sanctions.312 
Also in line with the safety approach I advocate adopting are the 
report’s recommendations to improve staff training and education,313 
to provide proper facilities and equipment,314 and to channel federal 
support to research efforts.315 
6.   The 2016 Report to the President 
The report found that: 
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[L]atent fingerprint analysis is a foundationally valid 
subjective methodology—albeit with a false positive rate 
that is substantial and is likely to be higher than expected 
by many jurors based on longstanding claims about the 
infallibility of fingerprint analysis. The false-positive rate 
could be as high as 1 error in 306 cases based on the FBI 
study and 1 error in 18 cases based on a study by another 
crime laboratory. In reporting results of latent-fingerprint 
examination, it is important to state the false-positive rates 
based on properly designed validation studies.316 
The report refers to confirmation bias, contextual bias, and 
proficiency testing and recommends continuing efforts to improve 
the state of latent-print analysis.317 
Finally,  
[a] second—and more important—direction is to convert 
latent-print analysis from a subjective method to an 
objective method. The past decade has seen extraordinary 
advances in automated image analysis based on machine 
learning and other approaches—leading to dramatic 
improvements in such tasks as face recognition and the 
interpretation of medical images. This progress holds 
promise of making fully automated latent fingerprint 
analysis possible in the near future. There have already 
been initial steps in this direction, both in academia and 
industry.318 
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7.   Summary and Recommendations 
It is important to stress that I do not advocate generally ruling out 
the admissibility of fingerprint evidence.319 Such a sweeping move, 
in my view,320 would be decidedly misguided. This is indisputably 
significant and weighty evidence321 that the courts should be allowed 
to continue to rely on. What is necessary, however, is that this type of 
evidence be improved and upgraded, and that it not be allowed to 
constitute the sole basis of a conviction. 
In the current state of affairs, as described, there is essentially a 
lack of scientific grounding for fingerprint comparisons, because the 
possibility of a random match has never been refuted. More 
significantly, courts are not presented with testifying experts’ error 
rates. It is therefore almost shocking that this evidence plays such a 
main role in criminal trials and convictions. Even if the Random 
Mach Probability were proven to be very low (or even zero) and the 
error rate proven to be very low (but non-zero), a conviction beyond 
a reasonable doubt would still be impossible to establish based solely 
on this evidence.322 Moreover, under the modern safety approach 
proposed in this article, it is necessary to strive to gather and present 
the most accurate evidence possible in a criminal investigation. Thus, 
there should be a rule requiring that examiners work for an 
independent federal agency rather than under the authority of the law 
enforcement agencies. As I will explain below, forensic science 
evidence—including fingerprint comparisons—should not be 
admissible in court unless the evidence has been developed as a 
                                                                                                                 
 319. I have stressed this point elsewhere, along with Dr. Halpert, for example in Sangero & Halpert, 
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 320. See Epstein, supra note 213, at 624–25, 627 (discussing claims that fingerprint evidence does not 
meet the criteria of the Daubert ruling). 
 321. Computerized models have been developed in the field of pattern recognition for the 
computerized comparison of fingerprints. See Joaquin Gonzalez-Rodriguez et al., Bayesian Analysis of 
Fingerprint, Face and Signature Evidences with Automatic Biometric Systems, 155 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 
126, 132–34 (2005). These models provide data on the error rate in various categories of test conditions 
for different systems. Id. at 133–34. Thus, computerized fingerprint evidence has an identification 
capability and enables the determination of an identification error rate. See Sangero & Halpert, supra 
note 59, at 71. There is still much to be done in this field, however. 
 322. See supra Part II.C (demonstrating the significance of even a low error rate). 
62
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 8
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol34/iss4/8
2018] FLAWED FORENSIC SCIENCES EVIDENCE 1191 
safety-critical system. A substantial leap in this direction would be to 
adopt the recommendations made in the 2009 NAS Report, the 2012 
Expert Working Group report, and the 2016 Report to the President, 
which conducted research to establish probabilities rather than 
absolute results, research on error rates, and development and 
implementation of appropriate protocols for fingerprint 
comparisons.323 
Finally, we should also recall the possibility that a wrongdoer or 
police officer may transfer an innocent person’s fingerprints to a 
crime scene to frame the innocent person. This possibility contributes 
to the lack of safety regarding fingerprint evidence.324 
F.   “Junk Science” As Evidence 
During the early modern period of history from 1450 to 1750, the 
infamous “Satanic witch trials” were conducted in England, in which 
women were accused of witchcraft and devil worship.325 To prove 
the guilt of the accused, so-called experts were called upon, who 
searched—and often found—the “Devil’s mark” on the women’s 
bodies.326 In particular, they searched for the remains of what was 
known as the “witches’ teat” by which the women purportedly 
nourished the Devil.327 These experts developed special methods for 
examining the women’s bodies for these marks.328 The English courts 
admitted their testimony as evidence proving guilt.329 Moreover, even 
when the Devil’s mark could not be found on a woman’s body, this 
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 325. ORNA ALYAGON DARR, MARKS OF AN ABSOLUTE WITCH: EVIDENTIARY DILEMMAS IN EARLY 
MODERN ENGLAND 6–8 (2011). 
 326. Id. at 114. 
 327. Id. at 114–15. 
 328. Id. at 119. 
 329. Id. at 61. 
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was not regarded as a sign of innocence.330 The convicted women 
were sentenced to death.331 The question that arises is: How far have 
we advanced since then? To this very day, courts unfortunately 
continue to admit certain types of evidence that are deserving of the 
title “junk science”332—such as microscopical hair comparisons, 
shoeprint comparisons, and voiceprint identification—as evidence.333 
The 2009 NAS Report reviewed in detail the various areas of 
microscopical comparison and comparisons based on an expert’s 
subjective impression, and determined that, with the sole exception 
of DNA comparisons, 334 none of these fields is currently grounded in 
science.335 
The law is not a science—certainly not an exact one. In the law, 
crucial decisions are made in conditions of uncertainty. In scientific 
research, there is no need to reach a conclusion at a particular given 
moment and the research can be continued until it reaches an 
advanced stage in which precise conclusions can be made. In a trial, 
there is a need to arrive at a determination within a reasonable period 
of time, and it is not possible to wait interminably for more data and 
information. Science is considered precise, and therefore, it is no 
                                                                                                                 
 330. Id. at 118. 
 331. DARR, supra note 325, at 73; SANGERO, supra note 8, at 125. 
 332. Even though the expression “junk science” was already in use in the 1980s, it only achieved 
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REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 2 (1991), and the similarly entitled article, Peter W. 
Huber, Junk Science in the Courtroom, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 723, 723 (1992). At a certain point, the term 
came to be used also to describe forensic science that leads to many false convictions. See, e.g., David 
Bernstein, Junk Science in the United States and the Commonwealth, 21 YALE J. INT’L L. 123, 124 
(1996); Paul C. Giannelli, Junk Science: The Criminal Cases, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 105, 105 
(1993); Thomas R. May, Fire Pattern Analysis, Junk Science, Old Wives Tales, and Ipse Dixit: 
Emerging Forensic 3D Imaging Technologies to the Rescue?, 16 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 13, 13 (2010); 
Sangero & Halpert, supra note 11, at 427. 
 333. BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER 
DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 158–71 (2000); Erica Beecher-Monas, Blinded by 
Science: How Judges Avoid the Science in Scientific Evidence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 55, 56 (1998); Garrett 
& Neufeld, supra note 38, at 71–75; Saks & Koehler, Forensic Identification Science, supra note 35, at 
892–93; GARRETT, supra note 7, at 95–100, 105–06. 
 334. NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 7 (“With the exception of nuclear DNA analysis, however, 
no forensic method has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a high 
degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between evidence and a specific individual or source.”). 
 335. NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 161; SANGERO, supra note 8, at 127. 
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wonder that legal practitioners tend to pursue it. When police 
investigators, prosecutors, and judges base a defendant’s guilt on 
scientific evidence they feel more secure and convinced. When a 
piece of evidence is truly scientific—that is, well grounded in valid 
and reliable scientific research—their reliance on this evidence 
should be commended, so long as they are not blinded into putting 
everything else aside and according this evidence more weight than it 
warrants. Even the strongest scientific evidence today—DNA genetic 
comparisons and fingerprint comparisons—are not sufficiently strong 
to serve as the sole basis for proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
This deficiency stems somewhat from the possibility of a random 
match, but has more to do with the far-more-probable likelihood of a 
lab error or error in an expert’s analysis.336 
This section is devoted to those types of evidence that are 
deceptively presented as “scientific” when they in fact lack a 
sufficient scientific basis, and moreover, when courts sometimes 
refer to them in their decisions as “scientific.” Junk science disguised 
as true science is likely to mislead judges and jurors into thinking it is 
actually scientific evidence and thus result in false convictions.337 In 
this section, I will consider additional factors that contribute to 
courts’ misguided admission of junk science as evidence: namely, the 
“Sherlock Holmes myth” and “CSI effect,” and the misleading or 
erroneous presentation of evidence by police and prosecution experts. 
Mention of an additional issue—beyond the existence of junk 
science—affecting the forensic sciences field, such as DNA 
comparisons, is necessary here. Namely, an uneven balance of power 
exists between the prosecution and defense such that almost all the 
scientific evidence submitted in court is presented by the 
prosecution.338 Even on the few occasions on which the defense 
                                                                                                                 
 336. SANGERO, supra note 8, at 128; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 61. 
 337. SANGERO, supra note 8, at 129. 
 338. An empirical study conducted in the United States found that court-appointed defense attorneys 
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counsel submits expert testimony, judges tend to prefer the testimony 
of the prosecution’s expert witnesses.339 
Crime laboratories, which engage in what is called “forensic 
science” and produce scientific evidence, are usually not 
autonomous, but rather operate under the direct authority of the 
police and prosecution.340 The laboratory personnel work closely and 
routinely with the police investigators and also with prosecutors at 
times, making it hard to expect them to be completely objective in 
performing their jobs.341 It is reasonable to assume that police 
investigators bring pressure to bear on lab staff to find evidence that 
supports the suspect’s guilt. In addition, the police investigators feed 
the lab workers details of the investigation that are completely 
irrelevant to the tests they perform, but that reinforce the perception 
of the suspect’s guilt, such as the fact that the suspect confessed or 
was identified by the victim.342 Here too, the misconception of the 
suspect’s guilt (“Tunnel Vision”) plays a vital role: many in the law 
enforcement system tend to assume that the suspect is guilty and that 
they need simply find evidence that proves this guilt.343 At times, the 
lab workers are requested, by definition, to conduct only the tests that 
are likely to incriminate the suspect, without performing any other 
tests that could prove his innocence or even incriminate someone 
else.344 At a later stage, the testimony of the expert is also likely to be 
misleading. Thus, for example, experts tend to testify to a 
significantly higher level of precision in the test that they performed 
than the real degree of precision according to the most up-to-date 
scientific research.345 
                                                                                                                 
Halpert, supra note 11, at 434. 
 339. Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 38, at 90–91. 
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 342. Thompson, supra note 30, at 1034. 
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 345. See id. at 84. 
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Many judges are unaware of the possibility—which always 
exists—of a lab testing error and do not question the experts on this; 
the experts, for their part, often do not bother to volunteer such 
information. Moreover, with regard to the majority of the branches of 
“forensic science,” even if the experts wanted to provide the court 
with information about the precision of the tests and their estimated 
error rate, they would not be able to do so due to the lack of existing 
research and data.346 
In addition, the majority of the “forensic sciences” branches—
particularly those in which experts testify on the comparisons they 
perform between marks at the crime scene and marks made by an 
object or limb belonging to the defendant—have been developed 
especially for the purpose of solving crimes; they were not developed 
by scientists.347 These branches are not, therefore, based on 
methodical scientific research with an adequate database, but rather 
on experience gathered by “experts” through their use of the very 
system developed to solve crimes.348 
It has been suggested that a distinction be drawn between scientists 
and technicians.349 To guarantee objectivity, scientists use “blind 
tests” to determine whether a particular result is correct or the 
product of contamination. In contrast, technicians usually know how 
but not why. Many forensic fields fall into the sphere of technicians’ 
work and not scientific work. Technicians, even when they are doing 
their job properly, lack the necessary scientific training to plan 
experiments that will turn their work into science. In addition, they 
lack the necessary databases for conducting statistical calculations. In 
fact, many forensic areas were developed by law enforcement agents, 
who, in their attempts to solve crimes and, often, to find 
incriminating evidence against the suspect, tended to turn unfounded 
                                                                                                                 
 346. SANGERO, supra note 8, at 106. 
 347. Id. 
 348. Id. at 107; see generally INNOCENCE PROJECT, www.innocenceproject.org 
[https://perma.cc/L9W8-TVS2] (last visited July 7, 2018). 
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premises of the individualization of certain crime scene marks into 
so-called science. Allegedly, if a mark found at the crime scene 
resembles the mark left by an object or limb belonging to the 
defendant, this necessitates the conclusion that the defendant’s object 
or limb left the mark found at the crime scene. This is the case with 
regard to microscopical comparisons of hair, fibers, tool marks, 
weapon marks, shoeprints, teeth prints, and even ear prints.350 The 
possibilities are limitless. 
At the suggestion of Michael Risinger, we should also include the 
great detective Sherlock Holmes on the list of those responsible for 
this current state of shoddiness.351 What do we all love about 
Sherlock Holmes? Among other things, he has contributed to the 
great faith we all have in the brain’s ability to perpetually and 
precisely deduce the criminal’s identity based on how the criminal 
acted from the evidence found at the crime scene. Not only the public 
at large but also forensic practitioners have apparently been raised on 
the Sherlock Holmes myth. Similarly, many wrongly think that the 
work of forensic labs is as perfect as it appears on the popular CSI 
television series, whose influence on jurors and other entities in the 
criminal justice system has been significant and harmful.352 
Studies have uncovered the development of a nonscientific 
subculture in laboratories, developed out of an eagerness to please 
police investigators. This subculture seeks to “deliver the goods” to 
convince the court rather than adhere to science, even if the results 
are equivocal and are likely to disappoint those who believe that the 
suspect committed the crime.353 This was the case in the infamous 
Houston crime lab scandal: the lab was closed down after it emerged 
                                                                                                                 
 350. BEATRICE SCHIFFER & CHRISTOPHE CHAMPOD, Judicial Error and Forensic Science: Pondering 
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that for many years, it had been systematically providing erroneous 
lab results, which had served as the basis for many convictions.354 
The exposure of the scandal in 2002 on a television program left 
authorities no choice but to make a sweeping investigation of the 
matter.355 After some partial reports, a comprehensive report was 
finally released in 2007 regarding the laboratory’s operation.356 The 
investigation, which reviewed over a thousand cases, uncovered 
wrongdoing by nine different crime lab workers.357 The investigation 
report pointed to a long list of malfunctions in the police lab’s work, 
including: failing to perform appropriate control experiments in DNA 
testing; systematically misleading reporting regarding the statistical 
significance of DNA matches that were found; failing to report 
possibly exculpatory findings in suspects’ favor; experts’ 
misrepresenting and exaggerating their credentials and training in 
court; misleading representation of findings; and even fabricating 
findings.358 It was found that these practices had continued for an 
entire decade, until exposed on the television program.359 Similar 
malfunctioning was exposed at the Illinois state police crime lab and 
in the work of Texas forensic pathologist Ralph Erdmann, whose 
testimony contributed to at least twenty death penalty convictions 
and who was convicted of falsifying autopsies.360 
One central problem is that some of the types of evidence 
submitted in the past to the court—and, in some cases, that continue 
to be presented—are based on forensic methods and techniques that 
are entirely unreliable, such as microscopical comparisons of hair, 
bite marks on the skin, shoeprints, and voiceprints.361 As clarified in 
the 2009 NAS Report, and as many scientists have cautioned in their 
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work, these identification methods have no scientific grounding, are 
not based on data, and are unreliable.362 
A second central problem is that the data collected in the 
framework of the Innocence Project revealed that the majority (61%) 
of expert testimony for the prosecution in cases with false 
convictions was invalid and faulty; the experts had presented the 
findings of the tests that they had performed misleadingly and 
erroneously and had arrived at conclusions in an unscientific 
manner.363 This was the case with regard to both the unreliable types 
of evidence discussed above as well as reliable scientific evidence, 
such as DNA comparisons and serological blood type tests.364 
Common to the experts’ errors in their testimonies was their biased 
presentation of the forensic evidence as stronger than it truly was in 
reality.365 
According to Daubert, judges are supposed to be “gatekeepers,” 
preventing entry into the courtroom of evidence that is not 
scientifically reliable or valid. However, in reality, usually only the 
prosecution succeeds in submitting an expert opinion—which is most 
often incriminating—because defendants lack the necessary 
resources to submit expert opinions in their favor. Because judges do 
not have expertise in all of the scientific or pseudoscientific fields 
presented to them, they are often misled by the prosecution’s biased 
expert opinion, whereas the defense attorney lacks the tools for 
refuting it. It is interesting to note that in civil trials, especially tort 
lawsuits—which never involve capital cases or human liberty and 
tend to revolve solely around matters of money—judges delve far 
more deeply into the evidence presented as scientific, and in practice, 
actually function as gatekeepers and prevent junk science from being 
admitted at trial. How does this happen? In civil law, expert opinions 
are often submitted by both parties to the litigation—the plaintiff and 
the defendant—which allows the judge to compare and confront the 
                                                                                                                 
 362. Id. at 161; SANGERO, supra note 8, at 135. 
 363. GARRETT, supra note 7, at 90. 
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evidence and make a far deeper investigation into its reliability and 
validity.366 In criminal law, judges tend to rely on the prosecution’s 
experts’ guarantees that they perform their work in line with precise 
scientific standards, and tend to rely on the defense attorneys to 
expose any imprecision in that work. Both these assumptions are 
misplaced.367 
An additional problem is that the professional expertise in the 
fields examined in crime laboratories is acquired in the framework of 
entities associated with the police and prosecution. The experts who 
testify at criminal trials are almost always prosecution witnesses and 
almost always work for the police. In effect, they see themselves as 
part of the law enforcement system and consider their job to be 
assisting law enforcement in finding evidence pointing to the 
suspect’s guilt. Here, again, we witness the destructive effect of 
preconceptions of the suspect’s guilt.368 
An extreme example of such an “accomplished” expert was Fred 
Zain, the head of the West Virginia state crime lab. The Innocence 
Project’s work revealed that Zain would often falsify the results of 
tests to fabricate supposedly scientific evidence that would 
incriminate suspects.369 An investigation revealed that he had 
shamelessly lied in his testimonies as an expert before courts in two 
different states in the United States and had manipulated test results 
in 134 different cases over thirteen years.370 Moreover, Zain would 
often testify in court that he himself had performed the tests when in 
fact others had conducted them.371 
Forensic experts do not perform their examinations as “blind 
tests”—that is, without knowledge of additional information about 
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the investigation—and in fact, police investigators often inform them 
on the details of the investigation. It is only natural as human beings 
that they are influenced by the knowledge that additional evidence 
exists supporting the suspect’s guilt, such as his identification by the 
victim, confession to the police, or even an additional piece of 
scientific evidence. All tests have the subjective component of the 
expert’s assessment and interpretation of the findings. The 
knowledge that there are other pieces of evidence against the suspect 
is likely to bias the expert toward an incriminating interpretation of 
findings that are not unequivocal.372 Moreover, in many cases, 
experts have been prevented from performing tests that are likely to 
rule out the suspect’s involvement in the crime, and in other cases, 
the prosecution withholds from the defense findings pointing to the 
defendant’s innocence. In their summations at trial, prosecutors often 
present the lab findings in a misleading and erroneous manner, so 
that they will be perceived as incriminating.373 
Another phenomenon that has emerged is that those experts who 
give misleading and erroneous testimony are not merely a few rotten 
apples, but are rather quite numerous. According to the findings of 
the Innocence Project, from among the 250 first exonerations 
obtained in the framework of the Project, 81 different experts 
working in 54 different laboratories in 28 different states across the 
United States were found to have given faulty expert testimony.374 
This should give one pause; consider the thousands of other trials at 
which these same experts testified but the convicted defendants have 
not been retried and, in all likelihood, will never be retried because, 
among other reasons, there are no genetic samples that can be tested 
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in these cases.375 Here, again, we feel the effect of the Hidden 
Accidents Principle in criminal law. 
Even when (genuine) scientists indicate in their research that 
certain methods are in no way scientific and call for an improvement 
of laboratory work practices, and even with methods that are 
grounded in science (particularly genetic comparisons), forensic 
scientists tend to resist the recommendations for improvement. They 
are used to the practices they learned in their training, have accepted 
them as correct, and followed them for many years; therefore, they 
see these suggestions for change as a personal attack that they almost 
instinctively attempt to fight.376 
Yet, to reduce the number of false convictions that stem from 
faulty expert testimony, there is an urgent need for fundamental 
changes in this field. This includes separating the forensics lab work 
from the police work to enable the lab to conduct forensic testing in 
autonomous, objective labs, instituting “blind” expert checks where 
the experts do not know that their work is being checked, requiring 
that experts base their work on data and provide the courts with 
precise data regarding tests’ error rates and adopting additional 
changes recommended in the 2009 NAS Report.377 
Finally, a technique that is particularly illustrative of junk science 
is microscopical hair comparison.378 Herman Douglas May was 
seventeen years old in 1988 and had been involved in a few minor 
offenses, such as stealing a guitar from a man who alleged owed May 
money but who refused to pay him.379 Around the time May stole the 
guitar, a burglary was committed during which a woman was 
raped.380 The woman identified May as the rapist in what the court 
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described as an unfairly suggestive identification procedure.381 At 
trial, moreover, the forensic expert gave testimony against May, 
according to which hair found at the scene of the crime resembled 
May’s hair, based on the expert’s microscopical examination of the 
hair samples, and May could thus be the source of the hair at the 
crime scene.382 May was convicted, and twelve years later was it 
determined that he was not the rapist, only after mitochondrial DNA 
testing was performed on both the sperm and hair found at the crime 
scene.383 A similar, infamous case is the false conviction of Gary 
Dotson for a rape that had never occurred, based on the 
microscopical comparison of pieces of hair.384 
In twenty-one of the first seventy exonerations in which the 
Innocence Project was involved, experts gave erroneous testimony on 
the microscopical comparison of hair.385 In a later study, it emerged 
that in seventy-five of the Project’s first 250 exonerations, the 
convictions had also been based on microscopical comparisons of 
hair,386 and in twenty-nine of these cases experts gave erroneous 
testimony.387 In eighteen of the cases, moreover, the experts had 
grounded their testimony on an individualization claim; that is to say, 
that the hair found at the scene of the crime was unique to the 
defendant.388 In six of the exoneration cases, mitochondrial DNA 
testing ruled out the expert’s assessment of a match between the hair 
at the scene of the crime and the defendant’s hair.389 
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The method by which hair is microscopically compared has not 
changed much over the last century.390 Hair (at times only a sole 
strand) found at the crime scene is compared to hair taken from the 
suspect.391 Routine practice is to take fifty strands of hair from the 
suspect when comparing head hair, and twenty-five pieces of hair 
when comparing the hair from another part of the body.392 In the first 
stage of the process, the expert makes a number of determinations 
with regard to the hair found at the crime scene: whether it is indeed 
hair and not some other fiber; whether it is human hair or animal 
hair; the part of the body from which the hair comes; the race of the 
person to whom the hair belongs; whether the hair has been dyed; 
whether the hair fell out naturally at the crime scene or was forcibly 
torn out; and whether the hair was cut.393 In the second stage, the 
expert examines the hair without using any instrument to determine 
its color and structure (straight, wavy, or curly).394 In the third stage, 
the expert examines the hair with a microscope and determines a set 
of characteristics that are then compared to the same characteristics 
of the suspect’s hair.395 These characteristics relate to hair color, 
structure, the structure of the hair follicle, and acquired features, such 
as cosmetic treatments or flaws in the hair.396 
However, these characteristics are not consistent for even one 
individual’s hair. And as they can vary on one person, there is a 
broad overlap in the characteristics of the hair of different people. 
Therefore, this type of comparison between pieces of hair from two 
different people often points to an alleged match. In addition, as this 
                                                                                                                 
 390. Walter F. Rowe, The Current Status of Microscopical Hair Comparisons, 1 SCI. WORLD 868, 
869 (2001); Sangero & Halpert, supra note 11, at 448. 
 391. NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 157. 
 392. Id. 
 393. Paul C. Giannelli, Microscopic Hair Comparisons: A Cautionary Tale, 46 CRIM. L. BULL., no. 3, 
2010, art. 7, at 1–2. 
 394. Id. 
 395. Id. 
 396. Rowe, supra note 390. For more details, see SCI. WORKING GRP. ON MATERIALS ANALYSIS 
(SWGMAT), FORENSIC HUMAN HAIR EXAMINATION GUIDELINES 10.1–10.5 (2005) 
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016/09/22/forensic_human_hair_examination_guide
lines.pdf [https://perma.cc/GVY8-9TXN] [hereinafter SWGMAT]; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 11, at 
448. 
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comparison entails subjective determinations, different experts are 
likely to arrive, and do arrive, at conflicting conclusions.397 There is 
no possibility of determining individuality based on a microscopical 
comparison of pieces of hair, and the probabilistic strength of such 
evidence is unknown. On this subject, the National Academy of 
Sciences stated: “No scientifically accepted statistics exist about the 
frequency with which particular characteristics of hair are distributed 
in the population. There appear to be no uniform standards on the 
number of features on which hairs must agree before an examiner 
may declare a “match.’” 398 The same report further stated that “in 
cases where there seems to be a morphological match (based on 
microscopic examination), it must be confirmed using mtDNA 
analysis, microscopic studies alone are of limited probative value. 
The committee found no scientific support for the use of hair 
comparisons for individualization in the absence of nuclear DNA.”399 
Today, a genetic comparison of hair can be performed, which is 
very precise and can be used to test the (weak) strength of the 
microscopic comparisons conducted in the past. There are two types 
of genetic tests.400 The first tests the DNA found in the cell in the 
root of the hair.401 This test is the preferred one as, aside from 
identical twins, no two people share the same DNA.402 However, the 
hair root is often not available for testing.403 In such circumstances, 
the second type of test can be performed: mitochondrial DNA 
testing.404 The working hypothesis is that mitochondrial DNA is 
maternally inherited.405 Were it not for the occurrence of mutations, 
                                                                                                                 
 397. Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 38, at 49; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 11, at 448. 
 398. NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 160. 
 399. Id. at 161. 
 400. SWGMAT, supra note 396, at 10.1–10.4; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 11, at 449. 
 401. SWGMAT, supra note 396, at 10.1–10.4; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 11, at 449. 
 402. SWGMAT, supra note 396, at 10.1–10.4. 
 403. Id. 
 404. Id. at 16. 
 405. Alice R. Isenberg & Jodi M. Moore, Mitochondrial DNA Analysis at the FBI Laboratory, 
FORENSIC SCI. COMM. 1 (1999), http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/july1999/dnatext.htm# 
[http://perma.cc/B6NA-MB99]; Richard E. Giles et al., Maternal Inheritance of Human Mitochondrial 
DNA, 77 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6715, 6715 (1980). 
76
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 8
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol34/iss4/8
2018] FLAWED FORENSIC SCIENCES EVIDENCE 1205 
everyone would have identical mitochondrial DNA; but mutations 
have led to differentiations across population groups.406 Thus, 
mitochondrial testing can rule out the possibility that the suspect 
committed the crime, but cannot determine the identity of the actual 
perpetrator because many people share the same mitochondrial DNA, 
passed on to them through a shared matrilineal line. 
The only circumstances in which some probative strength can be 
accorded to microscopical hair comparisons is when a suspect can be 
ruled out as the perpetrator of the crime.407 The National Academy of 
Sciences 2009 report stated the following regarding this possibility: 
The results of analyses from hair comparisons typically are 
accepted as class associations; that is, a conclusion of a 
“match” means only that the hair could have come from 
any person whose hair exhibited—within some levels of 
measurement uncertainties—the same microscopic 
characteristics, but it cannot uniquely identify one person. 
However, this information might be sufficiently useful to 
“narrow the pool” by excluding certain persons as sources 
of the hair. 408 
The general consensus is that microscopical hair comparisons are 
junk science.409 This realization was possible due to the development 
of genetic comparisons, which proved conclusively that 
microscopical comparisons are far from being scientific. One of the 
lessons that should be learned from this development is the definite 
possibility that courts will admit nonscientific evidence as scientific 
evidence and even convict based on that evidence. The problem is 
that there are still areas in which the courts treat junk science like 
                                                                                                                 
 406. Isenberg & Moore, supra note 405, at 2. 
 407. Giannelli, supra note 393, at 2 (“There is also agreement that, with sufficient exemplars, a 
person may be excluded as a suspect.”); Sangero & Halpert, supra note 11, at 451. 
 408. NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 156. 
 409. See, e.g., SCHECK ET AL., supra note 333, at 161–63; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 11, at 451–
52. 
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true science, and there is no possibility of providing compelling proof 
(through DNA testing or any other strong, concurred-upon technique) 
that the method is not scientific and must not be relied upon in a 
criminal trial. This is also the case with voice comparisons and 
shoeprint comparisons.410 
I have discussed the critical problems with junk science and 
elaborated on some of the changes necessary to make forensic 
evidence a more precise and scientific field, so as to improve the 
factual determinations in criminal trials and prevent judges from 
being misled. As an intermediate remedy—until the necessary 
fundamental changes are implemented—the courts must be more 
rigorous in examining “scientific evidence” brought before them and 
not admit dubious evidence warranting the label “junk science.” In 
line with the Daubert rule, for a given type of evidence to be 
admissible it must meet accepted scientific standards and be reliable, 
valid, and testable but, of course, unrefuted. In addition, in light of 
past experience, the courts must regard experts testifying before them 
with measured suspicion and not put blind faith in their testimony. 
To conclude this discussion of the phenomenon of junk science 
and its hazards, I would like to propose a simple test that will assist 
judges in distinguishing between an area that is most certainly not 
scientific and one that could be scientific but must be more deeply 
examined in line with the Daubert rule. I call this test the MIT test 
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology test). I came up with this test 
recently while giving a lecture on “Scientific Evidence versus ‘Junk 
Science’” to Israeli judges at a workshop. At the end of the lecture, 
the judge who had organized the workshop thanked me and 
recounted that because I “go against the flow,” he had deliberated 
whether to schedule my lecture at the beginning of the week-long 
workshop or at the end. I responded by telling the judges that this 
was not the important issue, and what is actually far more relevant is 
that almost all of the workshop lecturers were police forensic lab 
                                                                                                                 
 410. I elaborated on this at length in a coauthored article with Dr. Mordechai Halpert, Sangero & 
Halpert, supra note 11. 
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practitioners. I suggested to the judges that they learn about scientific 
evidence not from police lab technicians but from members of the 
academia: professors from the Weizmann Institute of Science or from 
the Technion (Israeli Institute of Technology), the Israeli 
counterparts of MIT. 
The judge who had organized the workshop regretfully noted that 
research work is not being conducted at universities in each forensic 
field. I immediately proposed the following to the audience of 
judges: “This, then, is an easily applied selection test, which can 
assist you judges in preventing junk science from entering your 
courts: when a piece of so-called ‘scientific evidence’ is submitted to 
you but is not researched at the Weizmann Institute or Technion, this 
is proof that it is not science!” 
I propose that American judges can apply the same test, simply 
substituting in MIT for the Weizmann Institute and Technion. Of 
course, this does not mean that any alleged expertise based on a field 
in which there is meaningful academic work should be automatically 
admitted as scientific evidence. But in the absence of academic 
interest and work, we can be certain that this is not science. This MIT 
test is an easy selection test relative to the Daubert rule, for it avoids 
both the complicated application of the Daubert standard and the 
embarrassment of the incorrect application of the tests by judges.411 
If the courts were to apply such a test, they would never admit as 
scientific evidence opinions submitted by charlatan experts with 
regard to microscopical hair comparisons and shoeprint comparisons, 
nor would they convict and send to prison defendants based on other 
junk science evidence. 
                                                                                                                 
 411. On the incorrect application of the Daubert rule by the courts, see Mnookin et al., supra note 
233, at 758 (“[E]ven after Daubert . . . emphasized the need for judicial gatekeeping to assure the 
validity of expert evidence in court, most judges confronted with pattern identification evidence have 
continued to admit it without restriction. If courts are not going to insist upon better evidence of validity, 
if they are instead going to continue to permit forensic scientists to reach extremely strong conclusions 
about their own abilities to make identifications, and if legal challenges remain both relatively rare and 
generally unsuccessful, then why should the forensic science community consider changing its 
practices?”). 
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III.   Safety Measures 
A.   Developing Forensic Science Evidence As a Safety-Critical 
System 
Based on a single piece of DNA evidence that was obtained when 
a sample was run through a database, Daryl Mack was convicted of 
murder and sentenced to death;412 he was executed on April 26, 
2006.413 Yet, as we have seen, there is a possibility, even if low, of 
computer software used in the DNA comparison producing erroneous 
findings, just as a lab testing error is possible. This is only one 
context in which forensic evidence can put the life of an innocent 
person at risk. As Dr. Halpert and I have shown elsewhere, any 
device used to produce forensic evidence is fundamentally a “safety-
critical system” in that it endangers human life.414 Studies have 
demonstrated how erroneous scientific evidence occasionally leads to 
false convictions, and this is no less catastrophic than a car’s brake 
failure. Yet no mandatory regulation is in place—regarding any 
forensic evidence whatsoever—to supervise forensic software or 
device development in accordance with safety-critical standards, 
despite the broad implementation of such regulations in other fields 
involving life and death.415 
Elsewhere we have shown that the outdated Fly-Fix-Fly method416 
is not a sufficient safety system, and that “black box” testing417 does 
not suffice either. Thus, it should be mandatory that devices 
producing forensic science evidence be developed using safety 
methods that are suited to their nature as safety-critical systems.418 
However, the greater hazard is that not even the Fly-Fix-Fly method 
has been implemented in the criminal justice system.419 When the 
                                                                                                                 
 412. Mack v. State, 75 P.3d 803, 803–04 (Nev. 2003); Halpert & Sangero, supra note 2, at 83. 
 413. Halpert & Sangero, supra note 2, at 83. 
 414. Id. 
 415. Id. 
 416. Sangero & Halpert, supra note 4, at 1297. 
 417. Halpert & Sangero, supra note 2, at 83–88. 
 418. Id. at 83. 
 419. Id. at 85. 
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manufacturer of forensic evidence equipment (such as a breathalyzer) 
markets a device that occasionally produces erroneous results due to 
a design or software defect, the chances that a court will detect the 
error are slim. In contrast, an airplane with a safety defect will 
necessarily be involved in an accident or incident (a “near miss”) at 
some point in time, and the defect will be exposed. This is not the 
case with flaws in forensic-evidence-producing devices. If an 
innocent defendant is convicted based on erroneous scientific 
evidence (assuming that the law allows a conviction to be based on a 
single piece of evidence), his claim of innocence will not be 
considered a refutation of the reliability of the forensic device, and 
the chances of proving a testing error are low. In addition, many view 
a conviction to be in and of itself confirmation of the device’s 
reliability. Therefore, to prevent or minimize the possibility of errors 
in forensic equipment, great precautions must be taken in the design 
and manufacturing processes. Due to the Hidden Accidents Principle, 
these are the only stages at which there is a reasonable possibility of 
discovering and avoiding defects.420 
A forensic device developed in accordance with safety-critical 
standards can be expected to produce more precise and reliable 
scientific evidence.421 To begin with, there will be fewer false 
positives; that is, fewer cases in which an innocent suspect or 
defendant is implicated by erroneous test results in a crime she did 
not commit. In addition, there will be fewer false negatives as well, 
in which a test or device erroneously rules out the actual perpetrator 
of the crime being investigated. This, of course, would lead to more 
efficient criminal law enforcement, making the safety improvement 
of forensic devices a win-win situation. 
Finally, legislators should enact regulation regarding the 
development process of forensic equipment designed to be used by 
the criminal justice system.422 An approval requirement should be set 
                                                                                                                 
 420. As Dr. Halpert and I demonstrated in Halpert & Sangero, supra note 2, at 77–82, the special 
legal proceedings in Chun concerning the breathalyzer exemplify this well. 
 421. Id. at 89. 
 422. Id. at 93. 
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for manufacturers of forensic devices similar to what is required of 
manufacturers of medical diagnostic devices.423 Legislators should 
also set a rule for the admissibility of evidence produced by a 
forensic device in criminal proceedings requiring that the device be 
developed and supervised as a safety-critical system.424 
B.   Other Safety Changes in Scientific Evidence 
What changes and reforms must the forensic sciences undergo to 
contribute to the legal field without misleading it? Important 
recommendations to this end were made in the 2009 NAS Report,425 
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) 
report from 2010,426 the Report to the President on Forensic Science 
in Criminal Courts from 2016,427 and various other research 
studies.428 
 
(1) The 2009 NAS Report recommended establishing a National 
Institute of Forensic Science (NIFS),429 with a similar 
recommendation made also in the 2010 NACDL report.430 
This Institute could be easily integrated into the Safety in the 
Criminal Justice System Institute (SCJSI) when 
established.431 Whether in the guise of the NIFS or the 
general SCJSI, such a federal agency should be tasked with 
the following: to set and enforce best practices for forensic 
science; to set standards for mandatory accreditation of 
forensic laboratories and mandatory certification for forensic 
                                                                                                                 
 423. Id. 
 424. Id. at 93–94. 
 425. NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at xix. 
 426. NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAW. (NACDL), PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 
STRENGTHEN FORENSIC EVIDENCE AND ITS PRESENTATION IN THE COURTROOM 1 (2010), 
www.nacdl.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=17775 [https://perma.cc/555G-TDVM] [hereinafter 
NACDL-2010 Report]. 
 427. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 130, at 2. 
 428. Halpert & Sangero, supra note 2, at 93–94; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 4, at 1322. 
 429. NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 19. 
 430. NACDL-2010 Report, supra note 426, at 3–4. 
 431. See supra note 1; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 4, at 1324. 
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examiners; to improve research and educational programs; to 
establish a standard terminology to be used in reporting and 
testing and model laboratories reports; and so on.432 
According to the 2016 Report to the President there is 
progress in this direction.433 
(2) A very important recommendation made in the 2009 NAS 
Report was achieving autonomy and objectivity by removing 
all public forensic laboratories from the administrative control 
of law enforcement agencies.434 In this context, it is crucial to 
ensure that all laboratory personnel receive only the minimal 
information required for performing the testing and that they 
be given no additional details about the suspect (optimally, 
they should not even know that the sample has been taken 
from a suspect) or about the case that are likely to bias them 
in performing the test.435 
(3) Some of the more important recommendations in the 2009 
NAS Report related to research development: the promotion 
of scholarly, competitive peer-reviewed research regarding 
the validity of forensic methods and accuracy of forensic 
analyses and data collection, as well as research on human 
observer bias and sources of human error in forensic 
testing.436 In the wake of this report, thirteen different experts, 
from both sides of the fence—forensic science professionals 
and academic scholars—joined together to write an article 
aimed at setting a framework for research culture in the 
forensic sciences.437 Their conclusion was as follows: 
We all believe that many forms of forensic science 
today stand on an insufficiently developed empirical 
                                                                                                                 
 432. NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 19–22. 
 433. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 130, at 125, 131. 
 434. NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 24. 
 435. See supra notes 219–225 and accompanying text. 
 436. NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 19, 22, 24. 
 437. Mnookin et al., supra note 233, at 725. 
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research foundation. We all believe that forensic 
science does not yet have a well-developed research 
culture. These disciplines, in our view, need to 
increase their commitment to empirical evidence as 
the basis for their claims. Sound research, rather than 
experience and training, must become the central 
method by which assertions are justified.438 
In response to the question, “What is a research culture?” the 
experts explained that it is: 
[A] culture in which the question of the relationship 
between research-based knowledge and laboratory 
practices is both foregrounded and central. We mean a 
culture in which the following questions are primary: What 
do we know? How do we know that? How sure are we 
about that? We mean a culture in which these questions are 
answered by reference to data, to published studies, and to 
publicly accessible materials, rather than primarily by 
reference to experience or craft knowledge, or simply 
assumed to be true because they have long been assumed to 
be true.439 
To this important explanation, I would add that the need for a culture 
of research in forensic science would be clear to all if there were a 
culture of safety in the criminal justice system. 
 
(4) Accreditation and certification: There should be mandatory 
laboratory accreditation and individual certification of 
forensic science professionals.440 
                                                                                                                 
 438. Id. at 778. 
 439. Id. at 740. 
 440. NAS-2009 Report, supra note 3, at 25 (Recommendation 7). 
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(5) A code of ethics: The 2009 NAS Report recommended that 
the NIFS establish a national code of ethics for forensic 
science and mechanisms for its enforcement.441 
(6) Education and training: The 2009 NAS Report also 
recommended taking measures to attract students in the 
physical and life sciences to pursuing graduate studies in 
multidisciplinary fields critical to the practice of forensic 
science. Moreover, law students, law practitioners, and judges 
should be encouraged to acquire basic knowledge in these 
fields.442 
 
The 2010 report of the NACDL, based on the 2009 NAS Report, 
offered more specific and detailed recommendations and added some 
new and crucial recommendations.443 These recommendations can be 
divided into seven major areas: 
 
(1) The establishment and funding of a central, science-based 
federal agency: The primary and central reform suggested is 
that Congress establish and allocate funds for a science-based 
federal agency, for the purpose of promoting “the 
development of forensic science into a field of 
multidisciplinary research and practice founded on the 
systematic creation, collection, and analysis of relevant data.” 
Validated and reliable forensic evidence is an important and 
vital component of the criminal justice system, and its 
development should be encouraged. Moreover, “[t]he results 
of any forensic theory or technique whose validity, 
limitations, and measures of uncertainty have not been 
established should not be admitted into evidence” in a 
criminal trial, and prior admissibility or use of the results of a 
forensic discipline, technique, or theory is not conclusive 
                                                                                                                 
 441. Id. at 26 (Recommendation 9). 
 442. Id. at 27–28 (Recommendation 10). 
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proof of their validity or reliability. Accordingly, one of the 
agency’s central and immediate priorities should be 
generating research programs for determining the validity, 
limitations, and measures of uncertainty of forensic theories 
or techniques, particularly with regard to forensic evidence 
that supposedly identifies any specific individual as being 
involved with a crime scene. This was followed by detailed 
recommendations regarding staffing, scope of responsibilities, 
an accreditation and certification board, and a proficiency 
testing program.444 
(2) Establishing a culture of science: The principle here is that 
“[a] culture of science that encourages independence, 
openness, objectivity, error management, and critical review 
should be promoted in forensic science practitioners and 
facilities.” This culture already exists among many forensic 
science practitioners and facilities, but a fundamental 
commitment to a culture of science should exist among all 
facilities and all practitioners. This was accompanied with 
detailed recommendations regarding autonomy, openness, 
objectivity, error management, and critical review.445 
(3) Setting a national code of ethics: The report expressed the 
principle that “[a]ll forensic science practitioners and 
supervisors should be required to adhere to a professional 
code of ethics that clearly articulates ethical obligations and 
contains a meaningful enforcement mechanism.” The detailed 
recommendations in this context relate to continuing 
education, acknowledgment of subjectivity, disclosure 
obligations, and enforcement.446 
(4) The institution of a prerequisite of research: The report 
recommended establishing and fully funding research 
programs relating to the accuracy, reliability, and validity of 
                                                                                                                 
 444. Id. 
 445. Id. at 4–6. 
 446. Id. at 6–7. 
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forensic theories and techniques and their limitations and 
measures of uncertainty where calculable. This would be led 
and conducted principally by credentialed and qualified 
scientists at national research institutions with forensic 
science practitioners, particularly “those guided by a culture-
of-science mindset and with histories of independence from 
law enforcement,” as active research participants and 
partners. Detailed recommendations were further given 
relating to determination of probability associations, 
relationships between research studies and case work, critical 
review, errors rates, automated techniques, bias minimization, 
and documentation.447 
(5) Improvement of education: The report noted that legal 
professionals generally lack the necessary scientific expertise 
and knowledge to understand and assess forensic evidence in 
an informed way. Thus, legal practitioners and judges must 
receive meaningful education and training “in the 
fundamentals of science, statistics, and common forensic 
practices; and in the limitations of, and potential forms and 
scope of error associated with, those practices.” The detailed 
recommendations related to law students, lawyers, and 
judges, as well as educational resources.448 
(6) The principle of transparency and disclosure: Transparency is 
vital to a fair and effective criminal justice system and a 
“hallmark of good science.” An attorney’s ability to evaluate, 
investigate, present, and confront forensic evidence at trial is 
contingent on complete and timely disclosure of information 
about the forensic examination, the conclusions of the 
forensic science practitioner, and the facility where the 
examination was conducted. “In every case involving forensic 
evidence, regardless of the current state of the science and/or 
advancements made, both the prosecution and the defense 
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will require full access to the forensic evidence and 
underlying data related to a particular case.” The detailed 
recommendations here related to transparency of forensic 
facility operations, ethical requirements, disclosure 
obligations, access to research and litigants, minimum 
disclosure requirements, reports, and databases.449 
(7) Allocating defense resources, particularly for indigent defense 
services: The principle articulated in this context is that 
“[f]orensic reform must be viewed within the framework of 
the fundamental constitutional protections established to 
ensure fair and accurate verdicts based on trustworthy 
evidence and to prevent wrongful convictions.” The 
prosecution tends to be the “primary proponent of forensic 
evidence,” but defense attorneys also sometimes use forensic 
evidence at trial. The report noted that many exonerations of 
innocently convicted defendants have been based on forensic 
evidence submitted by defense counsel. Defense counsel 
should, thus, be able to consult with forensic experts and 
experts in related scientific fields to present in court the 
scientific limits of the evidence, the results of independent 
testing, and the testimony of independent experts when 
appropriate. It was therefore recommended that the defense 
be ensured the necessary resources for obtaining such 
assistance from forensic and scientific experts and for the use 
of forensic facilities for independent, confidential testing. 
Indigent defendants, like defendants with financial means, 
moreover, should be ensured access to assistance from 
appropriate experts. The detailed recommendations addressed 
the topics of indigent defense, experts, consultation, and 
confidential testing.450 
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 450. Id. at 14–16. 
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The last important report with recommendations is the 2016 
Report to the President on Forensic Science in Criminal 
Courts: Ensuring Scientific Validity of Feature-Comparison 
Methods:451 
The study that led to the report was a response to 
[the President’s] question to [the Council of 
Advisors], in 2015, whether there are additional 
steps on the scientific side, beyond those already 
taken by the Administration in the aftermath of 
the highly critical 2009 National Research 
Council report on the state of the forensic 
sciences, that could help ensure the validity of 
forensic evidence used in the Nation’s legal 
system. [The Council] concluded that there are 
two important gaps: (1) the need for clarity about 
the scientific standards for the validity and 
reliability of forensic methods and (2) the need to 
evaluate specific forensic methods to determine 
whether they have been scientifically established 
to be valid and reliable.452 [The study] aimed to 
help close these gaps for a number of forensic 
“feature-comparison” methods—specifically, 
methods for comparing DNA samples, bitemarks, 
latent fingerprints, firearm marks, footwear, and 
hair.453 
Here are some of the recommendations: 
 
(1) It is important that scientific evaluations of the foundational 
validity be conducted, on an ongoing basis, to assess the 
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 452. Id. 
 453. Id. 
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foundational validity of current and newly developed forensic 
feature-comparison technologies. To ensure the scientific 
judgments are unbiased and independent, such evaluations 
should be conducted by an agency which has no stake in the 
outcome.454 
(2) The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
should take a leadership role in transforming three important 
feature-comparison methods that are currently subjective—
latent fingerprint analysis, firearms analysis, and under some 
circumstances, DNA analysis of complex mixtures—into 
objective methods.455 
(3) The NIST should improve the Organization for Scientific 
Area Committees (OSAC), which was established to develop 
and promulgate standards and guidelines to improve best 
practices in the forensic science community.456 
(4) The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) should 
coordinate the creation of a national forensic science research 
and development strategy.457 
(5) The FBI Laboratory should undertake a vigorous research 
program to improve forensic science, building on its recent 
important work on latent fingerprint analysis.458 
(6) The Attorney General should direct attorneys appearing on 
behalf of the Department of Justice to ensure expert testimony 
in court about forensic feature-comparison methods meets the 
scientific standards for scientific validity.459 
(7) Where empirical studies and/or statistical models exist to shed 
light on the accuracy of a forensic feature comparison 
method, an examiner should provide quantitative information 
about error rates. In testimony, examiners should always state 
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 456. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 130, at 15. 
 457. Id. at 16. 
 458. Id. at 17. 
 459. Id. at 18. 
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clearly that errors can and do occur, due both to similarities 
between features and to human mistakes in the laboratory.460 
(8) When deciding the admissibility of expert testimony, federal 
judges should consider the appropriate scientific criteria for 
assessing scientific validity, including “foundational validity” 
and “validity as applied.” Federal judges, when permitting an 
expert to testify about a foundationally-valid feature-
comparison method, should ensure that testimony about the 
accuracy of the method and the probative value of proposed 
identifications is scientifically valid in that it is limited to 
what the empirical evidence supports. Statements suggesting 
or implying greater certainty are not scientifically valid and 
should not be permitted. In particular, courts should never 
permit scientifically indefensible claims such as: “zero,” 
“vanishingly small,” “essentially zero,” “negligible,” 
“minimal,” or “microscopic” error rates; “100 percent 
certainty” or proof “to a reasonable degree of scientific 
certainty;” identification “to the exclusion of all other 
sources;” or a chance of error so remote as to be a “practical 
impossibility.”461 
CONCLUSION 
To the important and detailed recommendations made in the 2009 
NAS Report, the 2012 NACDL Report, and the 2016 Report to the 
President, I would add three general recommendations that 
implement three fundamental safety rules, and a fourth, unique 
recommendation, which I raised here. 
The first safety recommendation is that a legal rule must be set that 
precludes convicting on the basis of any single piece of evidence.462 
The rationale for this rule is that errors arise in every scientific test 
                                                                                                                 
 460. Id. at 19. 
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 462. We have seen the tremendous significance of the error rate. See supra Section II.C; see also 
Sangero & Halpert, supra note 59, at 43. 
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and that the possibility of an error, which is not negligible, prevents 
achieving proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt when based 
solely on a single piece of evidence. The second safety 
recommendation relates to regulation: manufacturers of forensic 
scientific equipment and forensic labs must be subject to safety 
regulation similar to the FDA’s regulation of manufacturers of 
medical equipment and medical laboratories. The role of regulating 
scientific evidence must be shifted from judges to professional 
regulators with expertise in the relevant scientific fields,463 which is a 
standard practice in other areas with regard to safety-critical systems. 
The third safety recommendation is that those who will engage in 
safety in the legal field apply the error-prevention model developed 
and refined in the medical diagnostics field, as described above in 
section II.C. The fourth safety recommendation is the adoption of the 
MIT test I proposed above in discussing the distinction between 
scientific evidence and junk science. Under this selection-test, which 
would precede the Daubert examination of evidence presented as 
scientific, if there is no systematic scientific academic work in the 
relevant field, then the evidence is not scientific. Finally, further 
recommendations for improving forensic evidence should be 
developed by the proposed SCJSI or by the NIFS. 
In line with the principles of safety, these recommendations must 
not, of course, be assumed to be exhaustive or necessarily well-suited 
to their goals. Rather, there is a need to revisit and check them after 
they have been implemented and to verify whether each one attains 
its objective, all in an attempt for unending improvement, as is the 
accepted practice in modern safety. 
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